flhealthlicense.vercel.app
64.29.17.3AS16509 · US- Browser Analysis● malicious
- Threat Intelligence● malicious
- Delivered file● suspicious
- Content Inspection● clean
- Network & Hosting● clean
- Related Infrastructure● clean
- TLS Fingerprint● unknown
- Domain Intelligence● unknown
- +1 more below
Dangerous — confirmed threat
Automated- 01It shows Adobe's logo and mentions Adobe in its text, on an address Adobe does not own.
- 02Its own script hands what you type to telegram — a route attackers use to collect stolen details.
- 03It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds.
What to do
Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.
This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.
What happened
Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.Findings
Strongest firstWe analysed the file this page delivered — it is Suspicious.
Success
SHA-256 8ab6a9131fd347bbfa763372986dec63bd99445dfada007f3e948653aee35735
The page's own script holds the address of a service phishing kits use to receive what they collect — a Telegram bot, a Discord webhook or a request-catcher — and hands it what the visitor types. Legitimate sites do not send visitor or form data to these. No request was observed: the kit only sends after the visitor submits.
Analyst noteDefinitive endpoint (Telegram/Discord/request-proxy), READ OUT OF THE PAGE'S SCRIPT rather than seen on the wire — no request was watched, because the kit sends only after the visitor submits. Capture it for an IOC/takedown and read what the script posts to it before calling it credential theft.
The file this page handed over is the ScreenConnect installer itself ("ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe"). Remote-management tools are legitimate software; what makes this an attack is that the visitor was given one under a different pretext, so the attacker ends up with remote control of the machine.
Analyst noteWe read this off the file the page handed over, not off the page: what the visitor was promised and what they received are different programs. ⚠️ The installer itself may well be signed and analyse Clean, because it IS the real product; the abuse is the pretext and the tenant it enrols into. Check that tenant before assuming it is not yours.
The page's own script names an installer for ScreenConnect, a legitimate remote-management tool, hosted on a different domain from the page. Attackers use these tools because they are signed, widely trusted and give full remote control once installed — the victim is asked to run support software, not malware.
Analyst noteThe URL was read from an inline script, so it is what the page INTENDS to deliver — a download may not have been observed. Check who operates the instance in the URL, and treat a remote-access tool offered by an unrelated lure page as a compromise attempt.
The page hands the visitor ScreenConnect, a genuine remote-control product. Once run it gives an outsider live control of the machine. The installer is validly signed by its real vendor, so antivirus and file-analysis engines correctly see nothing wrong with the file — the attack is the delivery, not the payload.
Analyst noteRMM abuse: the payload is a legitimate signed ScreenConnect client, so file reputation will be clean by design — do not read that as a false positive. The tenant hostname and the query parameters in the target URL identify the attacker's relay and are the IOC + the abuse-report target (report to the RMM vendor, not only to the hosting provider).
The page DISPLAYS a known brand's logo while carrying almost no content of its own — no article, no navigation, nothing the brand's own site would have.
Analyst noteThe brand is in the page's images, not just its words, and the page has nothing else on it. Check what the page is asking the visitor to do.
File
Stored by the engineWhat you download may be live malware. Open it only in an isolated environment, and do not double-click it.
The ZIP is encrypted. Password:infected
Inside the ZIP the file carries a name the engine generated, not the one the page used.
Delivered fileSuspiciousScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe
SHA-2568ab6a9131fd347bbfa763372986dec63bd99445dfada007f3e948653aee35735
Fromhxxps://volusialawyer[.]screenconnect[.]com/Bin/ScreenConnect[.]ClientSetup[.]exe?e=Access&y=Guest&c=Newreothersllc&c=&c=&c=&c=&c=&c=&c=
Infrastructure
- IP
- 64.29.17.3AMAZON-02 - Amazon.com, Inc., US · AS16509US
- TLS
- CN=WR1, O=Google Trust Services, C=US · expires Nov 27, 2026
Hashes & fingerprints
Page capture
LiveTitle “PDF Viewer” · brand shown: Adobe (medium)
Engines
9 · time to verdictPage
- HTTP
- 200 · Completed
- Title
- PDF Viewer
- Load
- 20.16 s · 12 requests