solarsavercanada.com

Our Content Inspection engine downloaded the file this URL serves and analyzed it. The payload shows traits commonly seen in malware. Treat it as unsafe until verified.

SHA-256 54bb91093df184d90f1f6156272578fdb6f07e055a2cd6823f2102958a348e8a

The page carries a complete execution instruction the visitor cannot see. The lure did not open on this visit, so the picture below is the page before any interaction, not the instruction screen; no command was obtained. Either way the page IS instructing a visitor to run something through the Windows Run dialog, in text it does not show them.

The page shows a challenge-provider logo (Cloudflare, reCAPTCHA…) that it fetched from upload.wikimedia.org, and it never contacted that provider's challenge infrastructure — a real Cloudflare or reCAPTCHA gate serves its own assets and talks back to its own servers. Also: the page printed no stock challenge wording our text capture could reach. This is the ClickFix family's costume stage: the fake gate whose checkbox press is what places the command on the clipboard. On the sample this rule was written for, the checkbox press produced no command on that run — this kit withholds it per visit — which is why the costume itself has to count.

The page fetched instructions from a public blockchain RPC node while showing the visitor nothing to do with crypto — no wallet, no token, no exchange. The next stage is held in a smart contract instead of on a server, so it survives domain takedowns and can be rewritten by its operator at any time. ⚠️ What this does NOT say: the contract's contents were not read, and the payload it returned — if any — is recorded separately when a later stage delivers it.