norcom.com.ar
82.29.80.47AS47583 · GBthis page loaded a hidden, encoded shell command
- Browser Analysismalicious
- Threat Intelligencemalicious
- Content Inspectionclean
- Network & Hostingclean
- Related Infrastructureclean
- TLS Fingerprintunknown
- Domain Intelligenceunknown
What happened
Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.Dangerous — confirmed threat
AutomatedIts page title claims to be Google, which this address is not associated with. It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.
What to do
Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.
This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.
Findings
Strongest firstThe lure never opened for us — it sits where our click could not reach it. We decoded the command out of the page's own code instead, in bytes this scan fetched: https://cfsubs.com/cdn/widget/a/a4045c662b80.js?v=7
Live attacker command — do not run this
This is the exact text the page instructs a visitor to run. Pasting it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R), PowerShell, or any terminal will execute the attacker's payload on your machine. Urlyze decoded it out of the page's own code and never executed it.
Command recovered from bytes this page loaded, not from a clipboard: it was hidden inside a base64 blob in those bytes and XOR-decoded with a key the same file carried (https://cfsubs.com/cdn/widget/a/a4045c662b80.js?v=7). Evidence for this sample: the response body; no instruction screenshot. Nothing was executed.
The page before any click — our click never reached the lure, so this is not the instruction screen.
Analyst noteTreat the command as the payload — read it for the download URL, the dead-drop (Telegram/blockchain) and the execution method. Evidence for this sample is the command and the response it came from; there is no instruction screenshot, because this kit renders its lure inside an overlay frame. Nothing was executed.
The page's structure/assets match a catalogued phishing kit — pre-built attacker software for cloning a brand's login.
Analyst noteKit rated high, corroborated by an outbound request to the kit's OWN infrastructure on another host — that is the kit running here, not a page that mentions it. 🔴 Do not go looking for a brand match, an exfil endpoint or a form-action mismatch: this is a clipboard-delivery family, it never renders a form, and all six harvesting legs are absent by design — their absence is not evidence against the match. Already observed on this scan: a fake verification gate · a decoded command · an address its own code names (https://www.gstatic.com/recaptcha/api2/logo_48.png).
The page performed a copy-to-clipboard step and the copied text was empty. ClickFix kits fetch their command from a control panel rather than carrying it in the page, so an empty copy means no command was in the page at that moment. In THIS scan the command for this visit was recovered anyway, from bytes the page loaded — see the command card: the empty copy is not an absent payload.
Analyst noteAbsence of the command on the clipboard is NOT absence of the technique. Check whether the page also prints Run-dialog instructions, and whether a payload request came back 200 with an empty body — that response is the discriminator between a panel that served nothing and a copy step that ran too early.
The page presents itself as a known brand (brand keywords/branding detected).
Analyst noteLow/medium confidence (keyword only) — can be a news article or partner page. Corroborate before acting.
The page dynamically injected scripts from other domains. This is extremely common on legitimate sites (CDNs, analytics, asset domains) and is shown for context only.
Analyst noteNoisy by itself — a CDN/asset domain (e.g. a brand's own *.githubassets.com) is normal. Only meaningful if the source domain is unrelated/suspicious.
Infrastructure
- IP
- 82.29.80.47AS-HOSTINGER - Hostinger International Limited, CY · AS47583GB
- TLS
- CN=YE2, O=Let's Encrypt, C=US · expires Nov 15, 2026
- Redirects
- 0 hops · / → /
Hashes & fingerprints
Page capture
LiveTitle “NORCOM” · brand shown: Google (low)
Engines
7 · time to verdictPage
- HTTP
- 200 · Completed
- Title
- NORCOM
- Load
- 2.12 s · 70 requests