Scan report · 7 days agoPublic

nhakhoataysaigon.com

160.191.88.102AS151858 · VN

page copied a hidden download-execute command to the visitor's clipboard (ClickFix)

Clipboard command reachesscript.google.com

Full command shown, with a warning, under findings

Engine tags
Verdict

What happened

Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.
Load 11.3 s · 97 requests
01 · Visitor opensnhakhoataysaigon.com
02 · Page shown
Just a moment…
03 · File delivered · maliciouse016981c-93f8-4b26-a64c-73e536e4dcf3.html
04 · Clipboard seeded · hiddenA command the visitor never seesdownload-executeThe text is under findings, behind a warning. It was never run.
05 · OutcomeThe visitor runs the payload themselvesPaste, Enter — no download and no login form for a filter to catch.

Dangerous — confirmed threat

Automated

It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. The file it serves was analysed and found malicious. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.

What to do

Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.

This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.

Findings

Strongest first
MalwareMalware found in the downloaded file
e016981c-93f8-4b26-a64c-73e536e4dcf3.html

Our Content Inspection engine downloaded the file this URL serves and analyzed it as a real payload — it matched known malware. Do not open or run this file.

Success

SHA-256 c9b5d53d16479fe709014fefa5be958e57f3f06498e4d7b53b4e5d4aa497d3bf

ClickFixClickFix: a HIDDEN command was copied to the clipboarddownload-execute

The page never showed this command to the visitor — it silently placed it on their clipboard and instructed them to paste and run something they could not read. The victim executes the attacker's payload themselves; no download or login form is needed.

Our probe obtained it by pressing the fake verification widget on a throwaway copy of the page — the page did not hand it over on load.

Live attacker command — do not run this

This is the exact text the page silently placed on a visitor's clipboard. Pasting it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R), PowerShell, or any terminal will execute the attacker's payload on your machine. Urlyze captured it inside an isolated browser and never executed it.

The page silently placed a shell command on the visitor's clipboard and told them to paste it into the Run dialog — the ClickFix technique. The command is NOT shown anywhere on the page, so the victim runs something they were never allowed to read.

What the victim is shown after clicking Verify (captured on a throwaway copy).

Analyst noteTreat the copied command as the payload — read it for the download URL, the dead-drop (Telegram/blockchain) and the execution method. It never runs in our sandbox; nothing was executed.

StrongCommand-and-control read from a blockchain node (EtherHiding)
polygon.drpc.org, rpc-mainnet.matic.quiknode.pro, polygon-bor-rpc.publicnode.com, public.1rpc.io

The page fetched instructions from a public blockchain RPC node while showing the visitor nothing to do with crypto — no wallet, no token, no exchange. The next stage is held in a smart contract instead of on a server, so it survives domain takedowns and can be rewritten by its operator at any time. ⚠️ What this does NOT say: the contract's contents were not read, and the payload it returned — if any — is recorded separately when a later stage delivers it.

Analyst notePivot on these nodes and on the contract address in the request bodies. A page with no crypto surface has no legitimate reason to read a chain.

SupportingFaked CDN 'checking your browser' page

The page reproduces a CDN challenge interstitial (e.g. Cloudflare's 'Just a moment…') inside a hosted file, rather than being served by that CDN's edge. It is a lure skin used to make a redirect look like a routine security check.

Analyst noteA genuine Cloudflare/DDoS-Guard challenge is served by the CDN, not uploaded to object storage. Treat the faked chrome as a delivery signal, especially alongside a gated cross-origin redirect.

InfoCross-domain scripts injected at runtime
9 script(s)

The page dynamically injected scripts from other domains. This is extremely common on legitimate sites (CDNs, analytics, asset domains) and is shown for context only.

Analyst noteNoisy by itself — a CDN/asset domain (e.g. a brand's own *.githubassets.com) is normal. Only meaningful if the source domain is unrelated/suspicious.

Infrastructure

IP
160.191.88.102INTERDIGI-VN - INTERDIGI JOINT STOCK COMPANY, VN · AS151858VN
TLS
CN=YE2, O=Let's Encrypt, C=US · expires Dec 5, 2026
Redirects
0 hops · / → /

WHOIS

Registrar
Nhan Hoa Software Company Ltd.
Created
Mar 18, 2022
Expires
Mar 18, 2027
Nameservers
ns1.tino.vnns2.tino.vn
105 malicious3 suspicious

Hashes & fingerprints

Page capture

Live

Title “Just a moment…”

Engines

7 · time to verdict

Page

HTTP
200 · Completed
Title
Just a moment…
Load
11.32 s · 97 requests
Stack · 14Apache HTTP ServerContact Form 7Facebook Chat PluginFlickityGoogle MapsjQuery