Scan report · 10 days agoPublic

lafriqueenbeaute.com

164.132.235.17AS16276 · FR

page copied a hidden download-execute command to the visitor's clipboard (ClickFix)

Clipboard command reachestestingcf.jsdelivr.net

Full command shown, with a warning, under findings

Engine tags
Verdict

What happened

Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.
Load 4.2 s · 201 requests
01 · Visitor openslafriqueenbeaute.com
02 · Page shown
lafriqueenbeaute.comstyled as Meta · low
03 · File delivered · malicious0dd84568-d6d6-4e97-97e7-e7db7ab39b45.html
04 · Clipboard seeded · hiddenA command the visitor never seesdownload-executeThe text is under findings, behind a warning. It was never run.
05 · OutcomeThe visitor runs the payload themselvesPaste, Enter — no download and no login form for a filter to catch.

Dangerous — confirmed threat

Automated

Its page title claims to be Meta, which this address is not associated with. The file it serves was analysed and found malicious. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.

What to do

Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.

This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.

Findings

Strongest first
MalwareMalware found in the downloaded file
0dd84568-d6d6-4e97-97e7-e7db7ab39b45.html

Our Content Inspection engine downloaded the file this URL serves and analyzed it as a real payload — it matched known malware. Do not open or run this file.

Success

SHA-256 cb20f9278f8c12277a2a49fa76c431f562ac50560088c1a4e3d13ecdd5bcc8a4

ClickFixClickFix: a HIDDEN command was copied to the clipboarddownload-execute

The page never showed this command to the visitor — it silently placed it on their clipboard and instructed them to paste and run something they could not read. The victim executes the attacker's payload themselves; no download or login form is needed.

Our probe obtained it by pressing the fake verification widget on a throwaway copy of the page — the page did not hand it over on load.

Live attacker command — do not run this

This is the exact text the page silently placed on a visitor's clipboard. Pasting it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R), PowerShell, or any terminal will execute the attacker's payload on your machine. Urlyze captured it inside an isolated browser and never executed it.

The page silently placed a shell command on the visitor's clipboard and told them to paste it into the Run dialog — the ClickFix technique. The command is NOT shown anywhere on the page, so the victim runs something they were never allowed to read.

What the victim is shown after clicking Verify (captured on a throwaway copy).

Analyst noteTreat the copied command as the payload — read it for the download URL, the dead-drop (Telegram/blockchain) and the execution method. It never runs in our sandbox; nothing was executed.

StrongCommand-and-control read from a blockchain node (EtherHiding)
bsc-testnet-rpc.publicnode.com, bsc-testnet.drpc.org, data-seed-prebsc-1-s1.bnbchain.org, data-seed-prebsc-2-s2.binance.org

The page fetched instructions from a public blockchain RPC node while showing the visitor nothing to do with crypto — no wallet, no token, no exchange. The next stage is held in a smart contract instead of on a server, so it survives domain takedowns and can be rewritten by its operator at any time. ⚠️ What this does NOT say: the contract's contents were not read, and the payload it returned — if any — is recorded separately when a later stage delivers it.

Analyst notePivot on these nodes and on the contract address in the request bodies. A page with no crypto surface has no legitimate reason to read a chain.

SupportingFake verification gate that measures the visitor
3 hidden fields, 1 invisible to the visitor, nothing asked of the visitor

The page prints a verification prompt, but no challenge provider is behind it and its form asks the visitor for nothing: every field is hidden state about whoever arrived (whether scripting is on, a mouse-movement count, how long they took, the device type) or a honeypot they cannot see. A page that SCORES its visitor instead of challenging them is deciding who is allowed to reach what is behind it — the shape of a phishing kit's doorway.

Analyst noteOpen the page's own script: this kit's is a single eval(atob(...)) that starts at a score of 70 and subtracts for navigator.webdriver and for 'headless' in the user agent. A genuine challenge is served by its provider and never scores you in page script. If an address is named above, treat it as the targeted recipient and check whether that mailbox got the message.

InfoBrand impersonation detected
Meta · low

The page presents itself as a known brand (brand keywords/branding detected).

Analyst noteLow/medium confidence (keyword only) — can be a news article or partner page. Corroborate before acting.

InfoCross-domain scripts injected at runtime
1 script(s)

The page dynamically injected scripts from other domains. This is extremely common on legitimate sites (CDNs, analytics, asset domains) and is shown for context only.

Analyst noteNoisy by itself — a CDN/asset domain (e.g. a brand's own *.githubassets.com) is normal. Only meaningful if the source domain is unrelated/suspicious.

Infrastructure

IP
164.132.235.17OVH - OVH SAS, FR · AS16276FR
TLS
CN=YE1, O=Let's Encrypt, C=US · expires Nov 13, 2026
Redirects
0 hops · / → /

WHOIS

Registrar
OVH sas
Created
Jul 3, 2024
Expires
Jul 3, 2027
Nameservers
dns104.ovh.netns104.ovh.net
99 malicious9 suspicious

Hashes & fingerprints

Page capture

Live

brand shown: Meta (low)

Engines

7 · time to verdict

Page

HTTP
200 · Completed
Load
4.19 s · 201 requests
Stack · 24Apache HTTP ServerBootstrapCart FunctionalityContact Form 7ElementorElementor Header & Footer Builder