claude.ai

The page shows this command in full — but the address it downloads from is encoded inside it, so a visitor can read every character and still not see what it contacts. The victim executes the attacker's payload themselves; no download or login form is needed.

Our probe obtained it by pressing the “Copy” button of a command block the page embeds from 6d8bc6dd-a56e-42b2-8549-2771fa8e9bd1.frame.claudeusercontent.com on a throwaway copy of the page — the page did not hand it over on load.

The page copied a shell command to the visitor's clipboard and DID display it - which is why it reads like a documentation page. It is not one: the address the command downloads from is base64-encoded inside it, so a visitor can read every character and still not see what it contacts. A real installer shows you where it fetches from; hiding that is the ClickFix technique wearing a documentation costume.