Scan report · 8 days agoPublic

www.rivistalibera.it

89.46.105.78AS31034 · IT

page copied a hidden download-execute command to the visitor's clipboard (ClickFix)

Clipboard command reachessail.autolabsouthgate.com

Full command shown, with a warning, under findings

Engine tags
Verdict

What happened

Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.
Load 6.4 s · 147 requests
01 · Visitor openswww.rivistalibera.it
02 · Page shown
Home - rivistalibera.it
03 · Clipboard seeded · hiddenA command the visitor never seesdownload-executeThe text is under findings, behind a warning. It was never run.
04 · OutcomeThe visitor runs the payload themselvesPaste, Enter — no download and no login form for a filter to catch.

Dangerous — confirmed threat

Automated

It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.

What to do

Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.

This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.

Findings

Strongest first
ClickFixClickFix: a HIDDEN command was copied to the clipboarddownload-execute

The page never showed this command to the visitor — it silently placed it on their clipboard and instructed them to paste and run something they could not read. The victim executes the attacker's payload themselves; no download or login form is needed.

Our probe obtained it by pressing the fake verification widget on a throwaway copy of the page — the page did not hand it over on load.

Live attacker command — do not run this

This is the exact text the page silently placed on a visitor's clipboard. Pasting it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R), PowerShell, or any terminal will execute the attacker's payload on your machine. Urlyze captured it inside an isolated browser and never executed it.

The page silently placed a shell command on the visitor's clipboard and told them to paste it into the Run dialog — the ClickFix technique. The command is NOT shown anywhere on the page, so the victim runs something they were never allowed to read.

What the victim is shown after clicking Verify (captured on a throwaway copy).

Analyst noteTreat the copied command as the payload — read it for the download URL, the dead-drop (Telegram/blockchain) and the execution method. It never runs in our sandbox; nothing was executed.

StrongFake verification gate wearing a provider's branding
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/94/Cloudflare_Logo.png

The page shows a challenge-provider logo (Cloudflare, reCAPTCHA…) that it fetched from upload.wikimedia.org, and it never contacted that provider's challenge infrastructure — a real Cloudflare or reCAPTCHA gate serves its own assets and talks back to its own servers. Also: the page printed no stock challenge wording our text capture could reach. This is the ClickFix family's costume stage: the fake gate whose checkbox press is what places the command on the clipboard. On the sample this rule was written for, the checkbox press produced no command on that run — this kit withholds it per visit — which is why the costume itself has to count.

Analyst noteOpen the asset URL: a provider logo served from an unrelated (usually compromised) site is the kit's shared infrastructure — pivot on it, every page loading it is the same kit. Re-scan later for the command; the payload rotates per visit.

StrongCommand-and-control read from a blockchain node (EtherHiding)
polygon.drpc.org, polygon-bor-rpc.publicnode.com, polygon.lava.build, polygon.rpc.subquery.network

The page fetched instructions from a public blockchain RPC node while showing the visitor nothing to do with crypto — no wallet, no token, no exchange. The next stage is held in a smart contract instead of on a server, so it survives domain takedowns and can be rewritten by its operator at any time. ⚠️ What this does NOT say: the contract's contents were not read, and the payload it returned — if any — is recorded separately when a later stage delivers it.

Analyst notePivot on these nodes and on the contract address in the request bodies. A page with no crypto surface has no legitimate reason to read a chain.

Infrastructure

IP
89.46.105.78ARUBA-ASN - Aruba S.p.A., IT · AS31034IT
TLS
CN=Actalis Domain Validation Server CA G3, O=Actalis S.p.A., L=Ponte San Pietro, S=Bergamo, C=IT · expires Dec 6, 2026
Redirects
0 hops · / → /
82 malicious

Hashes & fingerprints

Page capture

Live

Title “Home - rivistalibera.it”

Engines

7 · time to verdict

Page

HTTP
200 · Completed
Title
Home - rivistalibera.it
Load
6.38 s · 147 requests
Stack · 24AMPAruba.itCart FunctionalityCloudflare Browser InsightsContact Form 7Elementor