chillifarmsukabumi.com
153.92.11.220AS47583 · CYpage hides a command-execution instruction from the visitor
- Browser Analysismalicious
- Threat Intelligencemalicious
- Content Inspectionclean
- Network & Hostingclean
- Related Infrastructureclean
- TLS Fingerprintunknown
- Domain Intelligenceunknown
What happened
Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.Dangerous — confirmed threat
AutomatedIt is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.
What to do
Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.
This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.
Findings
Strongest firstThe lure never opened for us — it sits where our click could not reach it. We decoded the command out of the page's own code instead, in bytes this scan fetched: https://cdn.zrorolite.com/ppjupuboewoucnhpaz
Live attacker command — do not run this
This is the exact text the page instructs a visitor to run. Pasting it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R), PowerShell, or any terminal will execute the attacker's payload on your machine. Urlyze decoded it out of the page's own code and never executed it.
The lure never opened for us, so nothing was copied and there is no photograph of the instruction screen. The command below was not observed on a clipboard — it was decoded, base64-encoded, out of the page's own code in bytes this scan fetched (https://cdn.zrorolite.com/ppjupuboewoucnhpaz). It is what the page instructs a visitor to paste into the Windows Run dialog, in text it does not show them. Nothing was executed.
The page before any click — our click never reached the lure, so this is not the instruction screen.
Analyst noteTreat the command as the payload — read it for the download URL, the dead-drop (Telegram/blockchain) and the execution method. There is no instruction screenshot for this one: the lure sits where our click could not reach it (typically a cross-origin overlay), so the evidence is the decoded command and the response it came from. Nothing was executed.
The page dynamically injected scripts from other domains. This is extremely common on legitimate sites (CDNs, analytics, asset domains) and is shown for context only.
Analyst noteNoisy by itself — a CDN/asset domain (e.g. a brand's own *.githubassets.com) is normal. Only meaningful if the source domain is unrelated/suspicious.
Infrastructure
- IP
- 153.92.11.220AS-HOSTINGER - Hostinger International Limited, CY · AS47583CY
- TLS
- CN=YE1, O=Let's Encrypt, C=US · expires Nov 5, 2026
WHOIS
- Registrar
- Realtime Register B.V.
- Created
- Jun 12, 2025
- Expires
- Jun 12, 2027
- Nameservers
- ns1.dns-parking.comns2.dns-parking.com
Hashes & fingerprints
Page capture
LiveTitle “Home - chillifarmsukabumi.com”
Engines
7 · time to verdictPage
- HTTP
- 200 · Completed
- Title
- Home - chillifarmsukabumi.com
- Load
- 5.87 s · 61 requests