Scan report · about 4 hours agoPublic

crypto-blog.cfd

65.21.174.205AS24940 · DE
Gated · caught after the gate

An interaction gate (e.g. Cloudflare Turnstile) blocked full analysis, but a detection rule identified this page anyway. The pre-gate score below rates only what was visible before the gate, not the evidence this verdict rests on.

page copied a hidden download-execute command to the visitor's clipboard behind an anti-bot gate (ClickFix). Clipboard command reaches: serv.mevserver.cfd

Full command shown, with a warning, under findings

Engine tags
Verdict

Dangerous: confirmed threat

Preliminary / could not fully load
  1. 01Its web address was registered only one day before this scan (on 2026-11-15). Most phishing sites run on brand-new domains.
  2. 02It silently places a command on your clipboard, one it never shows you, and tells you to paste and run it yourself. That command downloads and runs a program on your computer (the ClickFix technique).
  3. 03It shows a bot-check screen that it draws itself. It copies a protection provider's wording but never contacts that provider.
  4. 04It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds.

What to do

Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.

Our scan did not get past the page's own fake verification gate, so what it leads to was not assessed. Re-scan later or verify through a trusted channel.

What happened

Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.
Load 25.4 s · 20 requests
01 · Visitor openscrypto-blog.cfd
02 · Page shown
Just a moment...
03 · Clipboard seeded · hiddenA command the visitor never seesdownload-executeThe text is under findings, behind a warning. It was never run.
04 · OutcomeThe visitor runs the payload themselvesPaste, Enter: no download and no login form for a filter to catch.

Findings

Strongest first
ClickFixClickFix: a HIDDEN command was copied to the clipboarddownload-execute

The page never showed this command to the visitor. It silently placed it on their clipboard and instructed them to paste and run something they could not read. The victim executes the attacker's payload themselves; no download or login form is needed.

The page silently placed a shell command on the visitor's clipboard. This is the ClickFix technique, which relies on the visitor pasting it and pressing Enter themselves. The command is NOT shown anywhere on the page, so the victim runs something they were never allowed to read.

Analyst noteTreat the copied command as the payload: read it for the download URL, the dead-drop (Telegram/blockchain) and the execution method. It never runs in our sandbox; nothing was executed.

StrongFake verification gate wearing a provider's branding
https://cdn.simpleicons.org/cloudflare/F6821F

The page shows a challenge-provider logo (Cloudflare, reCAPTCHA…) that it fetched from cdn.simpleicons.org, and it never contacted that provider's challenge infrastructure. A real Cloudflare or reCAPTCHA gate serves its own assets and talks back to its own servers. Also: the page prints “just a moment”. This is the ClickFix family's costume stage: the fake gate whose checkbox press is what places the command on the clipboard. On the sample this rule was written for, the checkbox press produced no command on that run (this kit withholds it per visit), which is why the costume itself has to count.

Analyst noteOpen the asset URL: a provider logo served from an unrelated (usually compromised) site is the kit's shared infrastructure. Pivot on it: every page loading it is the same kit. Re-scan later for the command; the payload rotates per visit.

SupportingThe host exposes an administrative surface
/phpmyadmin/ (admin panel)

We asked this host for a short list of paths that a correctly deployed site rarely answers, and it served them: an administration panel, a browsable directory index, or the application's own configuration.

Analyst noteRead what is behind these paths before acting: a panel or an index is where the campaign is operated from, and a configuration file often names the accounts and endpoints the operation depends on.

InfoFake verification gate with no provider behind it
cloudflare

The page draws its own bot-check screen: it copies a challenge provider's wording, but no challenge provider was contacted during the scan. Our scan did not get past it, so what the gate leads to was not assessed.

Analyst noteA real challenge loads its provider's resources; this one loaded none, so it protects nothing. It is part of the page. Read the verdict reason; the Gated Risk Assessment scores only the evidence gathered before the gate.

Gated Risk Assessment

This page shows a fake verification gate (it copies a challenge provider's wording, but no provider was contacted), and it was already identified by a detection rule. See the verdict reason for what fired. The score below reflects ONLY the weak pre-gate signals (score 6) and does not override that finding.

Pre-gate risk score:6pre-gate signals only

Pre-gate signals

Newly registered domain (WHOIS)Supporting
+6

created 1d ago

The final domain was registered very recently. The vast majority of phishing sites run on brand-new domains.

A days-old domain impersonating an established brand is a strong tell: real brands own old domains.

Path to gate (1 hops)

finalcrypto-blog.cfd
https://crypto-blog.cfd/

Infrastructure

IP
65.21.174.205HETZNER-AS - Hetzner Online GmbH, DE · AS24940DE
TLS
CN=YR1, O=Let's Encrypt, C=US · expires Feb 13, 2027

WHOIS

Registrar
Porkbun LLC
Created
Nov 15, 2026
Expires
Nov 15, 2027
Nameservers
ns41.link-host.netns42.link-host.net

Hashes & fingerprints

Page capture

Live

Title “Just a moment...”

Engines

8 · time to verdict

Page

HTTP
200 · AntiBotChallenged
Title
Just a moment...
Load
25.45 s · 20 requests
Stack · 2HSTSNginx