azanintl.com
213.190.7.99AS47583 · DEpage copied a hidden powershell-encoded command to the visitor's clipboard (ClickFix)
- Browser Analysismalicious
- Threat Intelligencemalicious
- Content Inspectionsuspicious
- URL Scannerclean
- Url Reputationclean
- Network & Hostingclean
- Related Infrastructureclean
- Domain Intelligenceunknown
- +1 more below
What happened
Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.Dangerous — confirmed threat
AutomatedIt is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.
What to do
Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.
This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.
Findings
Strongest firstOur Content Inspection engine downloaded the file this URL serves and analyzed it. The payload shows traits commonly seen in malware. Treat it as unsafe until verified.
Success
SHA-256 7ebb8a1e42ebf92c93550936fd0055c2bb3ba075e993608b6d0a91c9edcaa2f6
The page never showed this command to the visitor — it silently placed it on their clipboard and instructed them to paste and run something they could not read. The victim executes the attacker's payload themselves; no download or login form is needed.
Our probe obtained it by pressing the fake verification widget on a throwaway copy of the page — the page did not hand it over on load.
Live attacker command — do not run this
This is the exact text the page silently placed on a visitor's clipboard. Pasting it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R), PowerShell, or any terminal will execute the attacker's payload on your machine. Urlyze captured it inside an isolated browser and never executed it.
The page silently placed a shell command on the visitor's clipboard and told them to paste it into the Run dialog — the ClickFix technique. The command is NOT shown anywhere on the page, so the victim runs something they were never allowed to read.
What the victim is shown after clicking Verify (captured on a throwaway copy).
Analyst noteTreat the copied command as the payload — read it for the download URL, the dead-drop (Telegram/blockchain) and the execution method. It never runs in our sandbox; nothing was executed.
The page shows a challenge-provider logo (Cloudflare, reCAPTCHA…) that it fetched from precisionproving.com, and it never contacted that provider's challenge infrastructure — a real Cloudflare or reCAPTCHA gate serves its own assets and talks back to its own servers. Also: the page printed no stock challenge wording our text capture could reach. This is the ClickFix family's costume stage: the fake gate whose checkbox press is what places the command on the clipboard. On the sample this rule was written for, the checkbox press produced no command on that run — this kit withholds it per visit — which is why the costume itself has to count.
Analyst noteOpen the asset URL: a provider logo served from an unrelated (usually compromised) site is the kit's shared infrastructure — pivot on it, every page loading it is the same kit. Re-scan later for the command; the payload rotates per visit.
Infrastructure
- IP
- 213.190.7.99AS-HOSTINGER - Hostinger International Limited, CY · AS47583DE
- TLS
- CN=YE2, O=Let's Encrypt, C=US · expires Dec 3, 2026
WHOIS
- Registrar
- BigRock Solutions Ltd
- Created
- Oct 9, 2004
- Expires
- Oct 9, 2027
- Nameservers
- ns1.dns-parking.comns2.dns-parking.com
Hashes & fingerprints
Page capture
LiveTitle “Azan International”
Engines
9 · time to verdictPage
- HTTP
- 200 · Completed
- Title
- Azan International
- Load
- 5.52 s · 141 requests