Scan report · about 8 hours agoPublic

koyicinden.com

185.15.198.177AS201520 · TR

page copied a hidden download-execute command to the visitor's clipboard (ClickFix). Clipboard command reaches: gitlab.com

Full command shown, with a warning, under findings

Engine tags
Verdict

Dangerous: confirmed threat

Automated
  1. 01It silently places a command on your clipboard, one it never shows you, and tells you to paste and run it yourself. That command downloads and runs a program on your computer (the ClickFix technique).
  2. 02In the background it reads instructions stored on a public blockchain, while showing you nothing to do with cryptocurrency. A blockchain is a hiding place attackers use for the next step of an attack because it survives takedowns.
  3. 03It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds.
  4. 04A URL-reputation service classifies this address as dangerous.

What to do

Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.

This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.

What happened

Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.
Load 3.3 s · 79 requests
01 · Visitor openskoyicinden.com
02 · Page shown
Home - Köyiçindenstyled as Meta · low
03 · Clipboard seeded · hiddenA command the visitor never seesdownload-executeThe text is under findings, behind a warning. It was never run.
04 · OutcomeThe visitor runs the payload themselvesPaste, Enter: no download and no login form for a filter to catch.

Findings

Strongest first
ClickFixClickFix: a HIDDEN command was copied to the clipboarddownload-execute

The page never showed this command to the visitor. It silently placed it on their clipboard and instructed them to paste and run something they could not read. The victim executes the attacker's payload themselves; no download or login form is needed.

Our probe obtained it by pressing the checkbox inside the page's fake verification widget (“I'm not a robot”) on a throwaway copy of the page; the page did not hand it over on load.

The page silently placed a shell command on the visitor's clipboard. This is the ClickFix technique, which relies on the visitor pasting it and pressing Enter themselves. The command is NOT shown anywhere on the page, so the victim runs something they were never allowed to read.

Analyst noteTreat the copied command as the payload: read it for the download URL, the dead-drop (Telegram/blockchain) and the execution method. It never runs in our sandbox; nothing was executed.

StrongCommand-and-control read from a blockchain node (EtherHiding)
bsc-testnet.drpc.org, data-seed-prebsc-1-s1.bnbchain.org, data-seed-prebsc-2-s2.binance.org, data-seed-prebsc-1-s1.binance.org

The page fetched instructions from a public blockchain RPC node while showing the visitor nothing to do with crypto: no wallet, no token, no exchange. The next stage is held in a smart contract instead of on a server, so it survives domain takedowns and can be rewritten by its operator at any time. ⚠️ What this does NOT say: the contract's contents were not read, and the payload it returned (if any) is recorded separately when a later stage delivers it.

Analyst notePivot on these nodes and on the contract address in the request bodies. A page with no crypto surface has no legitimate reason to read a chain.

InfoBrand reference
Meta · low

The page names a known brand. On its own that is not impersonation: sites that sell, teach or write about a brand name it too.

Analyst noteLow/medium confidence (keyword only). It can be a news article or partner page. Corroborate before acting.

InfoCross-domain scripts injected at runtime
2 script(s)

The page dynamically injected scripts from other domains. This is extremely common on legitimate sites (CDNs, analytics, asset domains) and is shown for context only.

Analyst noteNoisy by itself: a CDN/asset domain (e.g. a brand's own *.githubassets.com) is normal. Only meaningful if the source domain is unrelated/suspicious.

Infrastructure

IP
185.15.198.177dedicatedtelecom - Dedicated Telekomunikasyon Teknoloji Hiz. Tic. San. LTD. STI., TR · AS201520TR
TLS
CN=YR1, O=Let's Encrypt, C=US · expires Feb 5, 2027
Redirects
0 hops · / → /

WHOIS

Registrar
Nics Telekomunikasyon A.S.
Created
Dec 30, 2021
Expires
Dec 30, 2026
Nameservers
dns1.sunucudns.comdns2.sunucudns.com
Related scans · 87+
17 malicious12 suspicious46 clean12 unknown2 same kit

Hashes & fingerprints

Page capture

Live

Title “Home - Köyiçinden” · brand shown: Meta (low)

Engines

9 · time to verdict

Page

HTTP
200 · Completed
Title
Home - Köyiçinden
Load
3.34 s · 79 requests
Stack · 19AddToAnyAddToAny Share ButtonsbxSliderCart FunctionalityColorMagFitVids.JS