Scan report · about 1 month agoPublic

inlogsysmx.com.mx

162.241.61.123AS31898 · US
Engine tags
Verdict

What happened

Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.
Load 14.1 s · 14 requests
01 · Visitor opensinlogsysmx.com.mx/ftx/
02 · Redirected · 1 hopSame host, another address/ftx/pod4mh-1787759570-67f03…1%2Falv%2B9EnTgZdPdFwgfRADu
03 · Page shown
e-signstyled as DocuSign · medium
04 · Data sent toapi.telegram.org/bot<redacted>/...
05 · OutcomeWhatever is typed leaves the pageA collection endpoint was observed; anything entered is treated as exposed.

Dangerous — confirmed threat

Automated

Its page title claims to be DocuSign, which this address is not associated with. What you type is sent to telegram — a route attackers use to collect stolen details. It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.

What to do

Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.

This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.

Findings

Strongest first
StrongExfiltration endpoint detected
telegram: api.telegram.org/bot<redacted>/...

The page contacted a service phishing kits use to receive what they collect — a Telegram bot, a Discord webhook or a request-catcher. Legitimate sites do not send visitor or form data to these. What this page sent was not observed.

Analyst noteDefinitive endpoint (Telegram/Discord/request-proxy): treat as malicious and capture it for an IOC/takedown. Read what is actually posted to it before calling it credential theft — some kits send only a visitor report.

SupportingPage delivers a remote-management installer (ScreenConnect)
https://atithyconstruction.screenconnect.com/Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi?e=Access&y=Guest · brand impersonation (DocuSign, medium); document pretext ("docusign")

The page's download button hands the visitor ScreenConnect, a genuine remote-control product, while presenting itself as a document. Once run it gives an outsider live control of the machine. The installer is validly signed by its real vendor, so antivirus and file-analysis engines correctly see nothing wrong with the file — the attack is the pretext, not the payload.

Analyst noteRMM abuse: the payload is a legitimate signed ScreenConnect client, so file reputation will be clean by design — do not read that as a false positive. The tenant hostname and the query parameters in the target URL identify the attacker's relay and are the IOC + the abuse-report target (report to the RMM vendor, not only to the hosting provider).

InfoBrand impersonation detected
DocuSign · medium · logo shown, brand named only in body text

The page DISPLAYS a known brand's logo while carrying almost no content of its own — no article, no navigation, nothing the brand's own site would have.

Analyst noteThe brand is in the page's images, not just its words, and the page has nothing else on it. Check what the page is asking the visitor to do.

File

The file was not analysed, so the scan carries no verdict on the file itself.

Infrastructure

IP
162.241.61.123ORACLE-BMC-31898 - Oracle Corporation, US · AS31898US
TLS
CN=YR2, O=Let's Encrypt, C=US · expires Nov 22, 2026
Redirects
1 hop · /ftx/ → /ftx/pod4mh-1787759570-67f03…1%2Falv%2B9EnTgZdPdFwgfRADu
83 malicious8 suspicious

Hashes & fingerprints

Page capture

Live

Title “e-sign” · brand shown: DocuSign (medium)

Engines

8 · time to verdict

Page

HTTP
200 · Completed
Title
e-sign
Load
14.06 s · 14 requests
Stack · 2NginxPHP