Scan report · about 19 hours agoPublic

cloud.repeatcarrental.com

188.114.97.1AS13335 · US

this page sends its visitors on to https://cloud.repeatcarr…ws/microsoft-store.php, which handed our browser an executable file ("ZoomWorkspace.ClientSetup.exe", https://cloud.repeatcarr…g/Windows/download.php) with no click

brand impersonation (Zoom, medium)
Engine tags
Executable deliveredRMM
Verdict

What happened

Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.
Load 10.5 s · 15 requests
01 · Visitor openscloud.repeatcarrental.com/meeting/
02 · Redirected · 1 hopSame host, another address/meeting/Windows/invite.php
03 · Page shown
Zoom Client Updatestyled as Zoom · medium
04 · File delivered · suspiciousZoomWorkspace.ClientSetup.exeHanded over by the page, not served at the scanned address.
05 · OutcomeRemote control of the machineA legitimate remote-management tool, enrolled into the attacker's tenant. The tenant is the takedown target.

Dangerous — confirmed threat

Automated

Its page title claims to be Zoom, which this address is not associated with. After a short wait it sends you on to another page on the same site (https://cloud.repeatcarrental.com/meeting/Windows/microsoft-store.php), and that page hands over a program to run on your computer. It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.

What to do

Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.

This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.

Findings

Strongest first
Suspicious fileSuspicious content in the downloaded file
ZoomWorkspace.ClientSetup.exe

We analysed the file this page delivered — it is Suspicious.

Success

SHA-256 b1aafcf30074a4b4c7cff06aeeb168c35151d20397015a3fffa070545347042b

StrongSends visitors to a page that hands over a program
https://cloud.repeatcarrental.com/meeting/Windows/microsoft-store.php

The page we scanned shows a wait screen and names one page on its own site as where it is about to send the visitor. We opened that page in our browser and it handed us a file — "ZoomWorkspace.ClientSetup.exe" from https://cloud.repeatcarrental.com/meeting/Windows/download.php — without anyone clicking anything. brand impersonation (Zoom, medium)

Analyst noteWe hold this file — it was delivered to our browser, so the file analysis on this scan is of the real payload rather than of the page. Nothing was clicked: the second page starts the download by itself. The submitted address only leads there, which is why it looks empty on its own.

StrongPage auto-started a file download
ZoomWorkspace.ClientSetup.exe

The page automatically triggered a file download. Normal landing pages don't do this; malware droppers do.

Analyst noteCheck the file name/type. An auto-download of an executable or archive is a strong malware-delivery tell.

StrongThe delivered file installs a remote-management tool (Faronics)
FaronicsSA.exe

The file this page handed over carries the Faronics agent's own component names in its contents ("FaronicsSA.exe"), under a name that says nothing about it. Remote-management tools are legitimate software; what makes this an attack is that the visitor was given one under a different pretext, so the attacker ends up with remote control of the machine.

Analyst noteThis name came out of the delivered bytes themselves — nothing opened or unpacked the file, so treat it as a strong hint about WHICH tool, not as proof of what the installer does. The page offered an update and the download is named after it, which is why neither mentions Faronics. ⚠️ Expect the installer to be signed and to analyse Clean, because it IS the real product; the abuse is the pretext and the tenant it enrols into. Check that tenant before assuming it is not yours.

InfoBrand impersonation detected
Zoom · medium

The page presents itself as a known brand (brand keywords/branding detected).

Analyst noteLow/medium confidence (keyword only) — can be a news article or partner page. Corroborate before acting.

File

Stored by the engine

What you download may be live malware. Open it only in an isolated environment, and do not double-click it.

The ZIP is encrypted. Password:infected

Inside the ZIP the file carries a name the engine generated, not the one the page used.

Delivered fileSuspiciousZoomWorkspace.ClientSetup.exe

SHA-256b1aafcf30074a4b4c7cff06aeeb168c35151d20397015a3fffa070545347042b

Fromhxxps://cloud[.]repeatcarrental[.]com/meeting/Windows/download[.]php

Infrastructure

IP
188.114.97.1CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc., US · AS13335US
TLS
CN=WE1, O=Google Trust Services, C=US · expires Dec 17, 2026
Redirects
1 hop · /meeting/ → /meeting/Windows/invite.php

WHOIS

Registrar
Isimtescil Bilisim A.S.
Created
Jan 31, 2025
Expires
Jan 31, 2030
Nameservers
melody.ns.cloudflare.comtitan.ns.cloudflare.com
88 malicious17 suspicious

Hashes & fingerprints

Page capture

Live

Title “Zoom Client Update” · brand shown: Zoom (medium)

Engines

7 · time to verdict

Page

HTTP
200 · Completed
Title
Zoom Client Update
Load
10.51 s · 15 requests
Stack · 3CloudflareHTTP/3PHP