Scan report · about 2 months agoPublic

sdsentura.com

192.0.78.173AS2635 · US

page hides a command-execution instruction from the visitor

a shell is opened, the clipboard is pasted and run, and none of it is on screen until something is clicked (ClickFix)
Engine tags
Verdict

What happened

Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.
Load 6.9 s · 298 requests
01 · Visitor openssdsentura.com
02 · Page shown
Home-new - SD Sentura
03 · Clipboard seededA command copied to the clipboardThe text is under findings, behind a warning. It was never run.
04 · OutcomeThe visitor runs the payload themselvesPaste, Enter — no download and no login form for a filter to catch.

Dangerous — confirmed threat

Automated

It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.

What to do

Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.

This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.

Findings

Strongest first
ClickFixClickFix: a hidden execution instruction — the lure did not open for us

The lure never opened for us — it sits where our click could not reach it. We decoded the command out of the page's own code instead, in bytes this scan fetched: https://mortilostart.com/vhpzobojmvrzwyguhk

Live attacker command — do not run this

This is the exact text the page instructs a visitor to run. Pasting it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R), PowerShell, or any terminal will execute the attacker's payload on your machine. Urlyze decoded it out of the page's own code and never executed it.

The page carries a complete execution instruction the visitor cannot see, and our probe could not get the lure to open — so the picture below is the page BEFORE any click, not the instruction screen itself. No command was obtained. Either way the page IS instructing a visitor to run something through the Windows Run dialog, in text it does not show them.

The page before any click — our click never reached the lure, so this is not the instruction screen.

Analyst noteLook at the screenshot — the on-screen steps and any verification ID are the evidence here. A missing command usually means the kit's panel was down, region-gated, or its own template was broken; re-scan later or from another egress to obtain it. Nothing was executed.

InfoCross-domain scripts injected at runtime
6 script(s)

The page dynamically injected scripts from other domains. This is extremely common on legitimate sites (CDNs, analytics, asset domains) and is shown for context only.

Analyst noteNoisy by itself — a CDN/asset domain (e.g. a brand's own *.githubassets.com) is normal. Only meaningful if the source domain is unrelated/suspicious.

Infrastructure

IP
192.0.78.173AUTOMATTIC - Automattic, Inc, US · AS2635US
TLS
CN=WR1, O=Google Trust Services, C=US · expires Oct 17, 2026

WHOIS

Registrar
GoDaddy.com, LLC
Created
Dec 5, 2024
Expires
Dec 5, 2026
Nameservers
ns1.wordpress.comns2.wordpress.comns3.wordpress.com
73 malicious4 suspicious

Hashes & fingerprints

Page capture

Live

Title “Home-new - SD Sentura”

Engines

7 · time to verdict

Page

HTTP
403 · Completed
Title
Home-new - SD Sentura
Load
6.87 s · 298 requests
Stack · 28Amazon PayClipboard.jsCloudflare Bot ManagementElementorFlexSliderFont Awesome