azanintl.com
213.190.7.99AS47583 · DEa frame this page embedded from another site fetched a shell command from its own server in plain text, with no interaction and never shown on the page (ClickFix)
- Browser Analysismalicious
- Threat Intelligencemalicious
- Content Inspectionsuspicious
- Network & Hostingclean
- Related Infrastructureclean
- TLS Fingerprintunknown
- Domain Intelligenceunknown
What happened
Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.Dangerous — confirmed threat
AutomatedIts page title claims to be Amazon, which this address is not associated with. It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.
What to do
Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.
This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.
Findings
Strongest firstOur Content Inspection engine downloaded the file this URL serves and analyzed it. The payload shows traits commonly seen in malware. Treat it as unsafe until verified.
Success
SHA-256 fe6fc125862242896b286c6cf4e42b70a3792268a07c816d20b436ee7077f16c
The lure never opened for us — it sits where our click could not reach it. We decoded the command out of the page's own code instead, in bytes this scan fetched: https://precisionproving.com/getcode.php
Live attacker command — do not run this
This is the exact text the page instructs a visitor to run. Pasting it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R), PowerShell, or any terminal will execute the attacker's payload on your machine. Urlyze decoded it out of the page's own code and never executed it.
Command recovered from bytes this page loaded, not from a clipboard: a frame this page embedded from another site asked its own server for it and was answered with the command in plain text, with no interaction required (https://precisionproving.com/getcode.php). Evidence for this sample: the response body; no instruction screenshot. Nothing was executed.
The page before any click — our click never reached the lure, so this is not the instruction screen.
Analyst noteTreat the command as the payload — read it for the download URL, the dead-drop (Telegram/blockchain) and the execution method. Evidence for this sample is the command and the response it came from; there is no instruction screenshot, because this kit renders its lure inside an overlay frame. Nothing was executed.
The page shows a challenge-provider logo (Cloudflare, reCAPTCHA…) that it fetched from precisionproving.com, and it never contacted that provider's challenge infrastructure — a real Cloudflare or reCAPTCHA gate serves its own assets and talks back to its own servers. Also: the page printed no stock challenge wording our text capture could reach. This is the ClickFix family's costume stage: the fake gate whose checkbox press is what places the command on the clipboard. On the sample this rule was written for, the checkbox press produced no command on that run — this kit withholds it per visit — which is why the costume itself has to count.
Analyst noteOpen the asset URL: a provider logo served from an unrelated (usually compromised) site is the kit's shared infrastructure — pivot on it, every page loading it is the same kit. Re-scan later for the command; the payload rotates per visit.
The page presents itself as a known brand (brand keywords/branding detected).
Analyst noteLow/medium confidence (keyword only) — can be a news article or partner page. Corroborate before acting.
Infrastructure
- IP
- 213.190.7.99AS-HOSTINGER - Hostinger International Limited, CY · AS47583DE
- TLS
- CN=YE2, O=Let's Encrypt, C=US · expires Dec 3, 2026
- Redirects
- 0 hops · / → /
WHOIS
- Registrar
- BigRock Solutions Ltd
- Created
- Oct 9, 2004
- Expires
- Oct 9, 2027
- Nameservers
- ns1.dns-parking.comns2.dns-parking.com
Hashes & fingerprints
Page capture
LiveTitle “Azan International” · brand shown: Amazon (low)
Engines
7 · time to verdictPage
- HTTP
- 200 · Completed
- Title
- Azan International
- Load
- 5.18 s · 135 requests