deiyeuwma-group.com
160.119.248.190AS329184 · ZApage copied a hidden unix-shell-pipe command to the visitor's clipboard (ClickFix)
- Browser Analysismalicious
- Threat Intelligencemalicious
- Network & Hostingclean
- Content Inspectionclean
- Related Infrastructureclean
- TLS Fingerprintunknown
- Domain Intelligenceunknown
What happened
Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.Dangerous — confirmed threat
AutomatedIt is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.
What to do
Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.
This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.
Findings
Strongest firstThe page never showed this command to the visitor — it silently placed it on their clipboard and instructed them to paste and run something they could not read. The victim executes the attacker's payload themselves; no download or login form is needed.
Live attacker command — do not run this
This is the exact text the page silently placed on a visitor's clipboard. Pasting it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R), PowerShell, or any terminal will execute the attacker's payload on your machine. Urlyze captured it inside an isolated browser and never executed it.
The command below was found ON THE CLIPBOARD at the end of the render. This scan did not observe the page writing it — the write hooks saw nothing — so treat it as evidence about the machine's clipboard, not yet proof about this page.
What the victim is shown after clicking Verify (captured on a throwaway copy).
Analyst noteTreat the copied command as the payload — read it for the download URL, the dead-drop (Telegram/blockchain) and the execution method. It never runs in our sandbox; nothing was executed.
The page's structure/assets match a catalogued phishing kit — pre-built attacker software for cloning a brand's login.
Analyst noteKit rated high, corroborated by an outbound request to the kit's OWN infrastructure on another host — that is the kit running here, not a page that mentions it. 🔴 Do not go looking for a brand match, an exfil endpoint or a form-action mismatch: this is a clipboard-delivery family, it never renders a form, and all six harvesting legs are absent by design — their absence is not evidence against the match. Already observed on this scan: a fake verification gate · a decoded command · a clipboard write.
The page dynamically injected scripts from other domains. This is extremely common on legitimate sites (CDNs, analytics, asset domains) and is shown for context only.
Analyst noteNoisy by itself — a CDN/asset domain (e.g. a brand's own *.githubassets.com) is normal. Only meaningful if the source domain is unrelated/suspicious.
Infrastructure
- IP
- 160.119.248.190Host Africa (Pty) Ltd - Host Africa (Pty) Ltd, ZA · AS329184ZA
- TLS
- CN=YE1, O=Let's Encrypt, C=US · expires Nov 17, 2026
- Redirects
- 0 hops · / → /
WHOIS
- Registrar
- NameSilo, LLC
- Created
- Mar 31, 2024
- Expires
- Mar 31, 2027
- Nameservers
- dan1.host-ww.netdan2.host-ww.net
Hashes & fingerprints
Page capture
LiveTitle “404 Not Found”
Engines
7 · time to verdictPage
- HTTP
- 200 · Completed
- Title
- 404 Not Found
- Load
- 51.22 s · 88 requests