anagalloway.co.nz
27.54.88.34AS38719 · AUpage copied a hidden unix-shell-pipe command to the visitor's clipboard (ClickFix)
Full command shown, with a warning, under findings
- Browser Analysismalicious
- Content Inspectionsuspicious
- Network & Hostingclean
- Threat Intelligenceclean
- Related Infrastructureclean
- TLS Fingerprintunknown
- Domain Intelligenceunknown
What happened
Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.Dangerous — confirmed threat
AutomatedWe found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.
What to do
Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.
This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.
Findings
Strongest firstOur Content Inspection engine downloaded the file this URL serves and analyzed it. The payload shows traits commonly seen in malware. Treat it as unsafe until verified.
Success
SHA-256 6dcaa217cb6521abc37eaf57d16776ac8c01bed43f4972ec3887d588a9b58277
The page never showed this command to the visitor — it silently placed it on their clipboard and instructed them to paste and run something they could not read. The victim executes the attacker's payload themselves; no download or login form is needed.
Our probe obtained it by pressing the fake verification widget on a throwaway copy of the page — the page did not hand it over on load.
Live attacker command — do not run this
This is the exact text the page silently placed on a visitor's clipboard. Pasting it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R), PowerShell, or any terminal will execute the attacker's payload on your machine. Urlyze captured it inside an isolated browser and never executed it.
The page silently placed a shell command on the visitor's clipboard and told them to paste it into the Run dialog — the ClickFix technique. The command is NOT shown anywhere on the page, so the victim runs something they were never allowed to read.
What the victim is shown after clicking Verify (captured on a throwaway copy).
Analyst noteThe copied text is a DECODER, not the payload — read the half below the "decodes to" line. That is what actually runs, and the download URL in it is the IOC to pivot on. We decoded it statically; nothing was executed.
The page fetched instructions from a public blockchain RPC node while showing the visitor nothing to do with crypto — no wallet, no token, no exchange. The next stage is held in a smart contract instead of on a server, so it survives domain takedowns and can be rewritten by its operator at any time. ⚠️ What this does NOT say: the contract's contents were not read, and the payload it returned — if any — is recorded separately when a later stage delivers it.
Analyst notePivot on these nodes and on the contract address in the request bodies. A page with no crypto surface has no legitimate reason to read a chain.
The page dynamically injected scripts from other domains. This is extremely common on legitimate sites (CDNs, analytics, asset domains) and is shown for context only.
Analyst noteNoisy by itself — a CDN/asset domain (e.g. a brand's own *.githubassets.com) is normal. Only meaningful if the source domain is unrelated/suspicious.
Infrastructure
- IP
- 27.54.88.34DREAMSCAPE-AS-AP - Dreamscape Networks Limited, AU · AS38719AU
- TLS
- CN=Sectigo Public Server Authentication CA DV R36, O=Sectigo Limited, C=GB · expires Jan 2, 2027
- Redirects
- 1 hop · / → /
Hashes & fingerprints
Page capture
LiveTitle “New Zealand Wedding Photographer | Ana Galloway”
Engines
7 · time to verdictPage
- HTTP
- 200 · Completed
- Title
- New Zealand Wedding Photographer | Ana Galloway
- Load
- 19.90 s · 87 requests