Scan report · 2 days agoPublic

laboratoires-azbane.com

192.185.143.249AS31898 · US
Engine tags
Verdict

What happened

Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.
Load 13.1 s · 14 requests
01 · Visitor openslaboratoires-azbane.com/ftx/
02 · Redirected · 1 hopSame host, another address/ftx/j0ruix-1790846428-12ae0…mVlODVjOTUzODlhZGZhZWI1MmE1
03 · Page shown
DocuSign · Secure Document Accessstyled as DocuSign · medium
04 · Data sent toapi.telegram.org/bot<redacted>/...
05 · OutcomeRemote control of the machineA legitimate remote-management tool, enrolled into the attacker's tenant. The tenant is the takedown target.

Dangerous — confirmed threat

Automated

Its page title claims to be DocuSign, which this address is not associated with. What you type is sent to telegram — a route attackers use to collect stolen details. It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.

What to do

Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.

This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.

Findings

Strongest first
StrongExfiltration endpoint detected
telegram: api.telegram.org/bot<redacted>/...

The page contacted a service phishing kits use to receive what they collect — a Telegram bot, a Discord webhook or a request-catcher. Legitimate sites do not send visitor or form data to these. What this page sent was not observed.

Analyst noteDefinitive endpoint (Telegram/Discord/request-proxy): treat as malicious and capture it for an IOC/takedown. Read what is actually posted to it before calling it credential theft — some kits send only a visitor report.

SupportingPage hands the visitor a remote-access installer (ScreenConnect)
https://valeriediedrich13.screenconnect.com/Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe?e=Access&y=Guest

The page's own script names an installer for ScreenConnect, a legitimate remote-management tool, hosted on a different domain from the page. Attackers use these tools because they are signed, widely trusted and give full remote control once installed — the victim is asked to run support software, not malware.

Analyst noteThe URL was read from an inline script, so it is what the page INTENDS to deliver — a download may not have been observed. Check who operates the instance in the URL, and treat a remote-access tool offered by an unrelated lure page as a compromise attempt.

SupportingPage delivers a remote-management installer (ScreenConnect)
https://twc26.screenconnect.com/Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe?e=Access&y=Guest · brand impersonation (DocuSign, medium); document pretext ("docusign")

The page's download button hands the visitor ScreenConnect, a genuine remote-control product, while presenting itself as a document. Once run it gives an outsider live control of the machine. The installer is validly signed by its real vendor, so antivirus and file-analysis engines correctly see nothing wrong with the file — the attack is the pretext, not the payload.

Analyst noteRMM abuse: the payload is a legitimate signed ScreenConnect client, so file reputation will be clean by design — do not read that as a false positive. The tenant hostname and the query parameters in the target URL identify the attacker's relay and are the IOC + the abuse-report target (report to the RMM vendor, not only to the hosting provider).

InfoBrand impersonation detected
DocuSign · medium

The page presents itself as a known brand (brand keywords/branding detected).

Analyst noteLow/medium confidence (keyword only) — can be a news article or partner page. Corroborate before acting.

File

The file was not analysed, so the scan carries no verdict on the file itself.

Infrastructure

IP
192.185.143.249ORACLE-BMC-31898 - Oracle Corporation, US · AS31898US
TLS
CN=YR1, O=Let's Encrypt, C=US · expires Dec 26, 2026
Redirects
1 hop · /ftx/ → /ftx/j0ruix-1790846428-12ae0…mVlODVjOTUzODlhZGZhZWI1MmE1

WHOIS

Registrar
GoDaddy.com, LLC
Created
Jun 22, 2000
Expires
Jun 22, 2028
Nameservers
ns1.ivolio.comns2.ivolio.com
94 malicious5 suspicious

Hashes & fingerprints

Page capture

Live

Title “DocuSign · Secure Document Access” · brand shown: DocuSign (medium)

Engines

7 · time to verdict

Page

HTTP
200 · Completed
Title
DocuSign · Secure Document Access
Load
13.08 s · 14 requests
Stack · 2Apache HTTP ServerPHP