Scan report · 6 days agoPublic

helloworldscaffolding.com

185.146.167.201AS48254 · GB

page copied a hidden download-execute command to the visitor's clipboard (ClickFix)

Clipboard command reachesuramzkabachok.com

Full command shown, with a warning, under findings

Engine tags
Verdict

What happened

Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.
Load 11.7 s · 132 requests
01 · Visitor openshelloworldscaffolding.com
02 · Page shown
helloworldscaffolding – scaffoldingstyled as Google · low
03 · File delivered · malicious4bcc3c4e-6c7d-422b-b87b-673f5526faf2.html
04 · Clipboard seeded · hiddenA command the visitor never seesdownload-executeThe text is under findings, behind a warning. It was never run.
05 · OutcomeThe visitor runs the payload themselvesPaste, Enter — no download and no login form for a filter to catch.

Dangerous — confirmed threat

Automated

Its page title claims to be Google, which this address is not associated with. It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. The file it serves was analysed and found malicious. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.

What to do

Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.

This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.

Findings

Strongest first
MalwareMalware found in the downloaded file
4bcc3c4e-6c7d-422b-b87b-673f5526faf2.html

Our Content Inspection engine downloaded the file this URL serves and analyzed it as a real payload — it matched known malware. Do not open or run this file.

Success

SHA-256 a6685637dbedf778b3ac06319c172dc7647a5a1e0a55fc141a9e282369639019

ClickFixClickFix: a HIDDEN command was copied to the clipboarddownload-execute

The page never showed this command to the visitor — it silently placed it on their clipboard and instructed them to paste and run something they could not read. The victim executes the attacker's payload themselves; no download or login form is needed.

Our probe obtained it by pressing the fake verification widget on a throwaway copy of the page — the page did not hand it over on load.

Live attacker command — do not run this

This is the exact text the page silently placed on a visitor's clipboard. Pasting it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R), PowerShell, or any terminal will execute the attacker's payload on your machine. Urlyze captured it inside an isolated browser and never executed it.

The page silently placed a shell command on the visitor's clipboard and told them to paste it into the Run dialog — the ClickFix technique. The command is NOT shown anywhere on the page, so the victim runs something they were never allowed to read.

What the victim is shown after clicking Verify (captured on a throwaway copy).

Analyst noteTreat the copied command as the payload — read it for the download URL, the dead-drop (Telegram/blockchain) and the execution method. It never runs in our sandbox; nothing was executed.

StrongCommand-and-control read from a blockchain node (EtherHiding)
polygon.gateway.tenderly.co, 1rpc.io, rpc.ankr.com, polygon.drpc.org

The page fetched instructions from a public blockchain RPC node while showing the visitor nothing to do with crypto — no wallet, no token, no exchange. The next stage is held in a smart contract instead of on a server, so it survives domain takedowns and can be rewritten by its operator at any time. ⚠️ What this does NOT say: the contract's contents were not read, and the payload it returned — if any — is recorded separately when a later stage delivers it.

Analyst notePivot on these nodes and on the contract address in the request bodies. A page with no crypto surface has no legitimate reason to read a chain.

SupportingKnown phishing-kit signature matched
FKRC Fake reCAPTCHA ClickFix · FKRC · high

The page's structure/assets match a catalogued phishing kit — pre-built attacker software for cloning a brand's login.

Analyst noteKit rated high, corroborated by an outbound request to the kit's OWN infrastructure on another host — that is the kit running here, not a page that mentions it. 🔴 Do not go looking for a brand match, an exfil endpoint or a form-action mismatch: this is a clipboard-delivery family, it never renders a form, and all six harvesting legs are absent by design — their absence is not evidence against the match. Already observed on this scan: a decoded command · a clipboard write · an address its own code names (http://45.131.215.56/8031e818c7a46?force=1).

InfoBrand impersonation detected
Google · low

The page presents itself as a known brand (brand keywords/branding detected).

Analyst noteLow/medium confidence (keyword only) — can be a news article or partner page. Corroborate before acting.

InfoCross-domain scripts injected at runtime
7 script(s)

The page dynamically injected scripts from other domains. This is extremely common on legitimate sites (CDNs, analytics, asset domains) and is shown for context only.

Analyst noteNoisy by itself — a CDN/asset domain (e.g. a brand's own *.githubassets.com) is normal. Only meaningful if the source domain is unrelated/suspicious.

Infrastructure

IP
185.146.167.201TWENTYI - 20i Limited, GB · AS48254GB
TLS
CN=YR1, O=Let's Encrypt, C=US · expires Nov 13, 2026
Redirects
0 hops · / → /

WHOIS

Registrar
Tucows Domains Inc.
Created
Mar 12, 2022
Expires
Mar 12, 2027
Nameservers
ns1.stackdns.comns2.stackdns.comns3.stackdns.comns4.stackdns.com
148 malicious6 suspicious

Hashes & fingerprints

Page capture

Live

Title “helloworldscaffolding – scaffolding” · brand shown: Google (low)

Engines

7 · time to verdict

Page

HTTP
200 · Completed
Title
helloworldscaffolding – scaffolding
Load
11.67 s · 132 requests
Stack · 14Apache HTTP ServerBootstrapContact Form 7ElementorjQueryjQuery Migrate