Scan report · about 1 month agoPublic

claude-macos-app.com

172.67.191.162AS13335 · US

the page's own code carries a hidden, encoded shell command it instructs the visitor to paste and run

decoded from bytes this scan fetched, never shown on the page (ClickFix)
Engine tags
Verdict

What happened

Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.
Load 3.2 s · 6 requests
01 · Visitor opensclaude-macos-app.com
02 · Page shown
Download Claude | Claude by Anthropicstyled as Anthropic · high
03 · Clipboard seededA command copied to the clipboardThe text is under findings, behind a warning. It was never run.
04 · OutcomeThe visitor runs the payload themselvesPaste, Enter — no download and no login form for a filter to catch.

Dangerous — confirmed threat

Automated

It presents itself as Anthropic while being hosted somewhere Anthropic does not own. It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.

What to do

Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.

This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.

Findings

Strongest first
ClickFixClickFix: a hidden execution instruction — we read the command out of the page's own code

The lure never opened for us — it sits where our click could not reach it. We decoded the command out of the page's own code instead, in bytes this scan fetched: https://claude-macos-app.com/

Live attacker command — do not run this

This is the exact text the page instructs a visitor to run. Pasting it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R), PowerShell, or any terminal will execute the attacker's payload on your machine. Urlyze decoded it out of the page's own code and never executed it.

The lure never opened for us, so nothing was copied and there is no photograph of the instruction screen. The command below was not observed on a clipboard — it was decoded, base64-encoded, out of the page's own code in bytes this scan fetched (https://claude-macos-app.com/). It is what the page instructs a visitor to paste into the Windows Run dialog, in text it does not show them. Nothing was executed.

Analyst noteTreat the command as the payload — read it for the download URL, the dead-drop (Telegram/blockchain) and the execution method. There is no instruction screenshot for this one: the lure sits where our click could not reach it (typically a cross-origin overlay), so the evidence is the decoded command and the response it came from. Nothing was executed.

SupportingBrand impersonation detected
Anthropic · high

The page presents itself as a known brand (brand keywords/branding detected).

Analyst noteHigh confidence: brand keywords AND a password field — classic credential phishing.

Infrastructure

IP
172.67.191.162CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc., US · AS13335US
TLS
CN=WE1, O=Google Trust Services, C=US · expires Nov 23, 2026

WHOIS

Registrar
Dominet (HK) Limited
Created
Aug 25, 2026
Expires
Aug 25, 2027
Nameservers
aliza.ns.cloudflare.comrohin.ns.cloudflare.com
75 malicious16 suspicious

Hashes & fingerprints

Page capture

Live

Title “Download Claude | Claude by Anthropic” · brand shown: Anthropic (high)

Engines

7 · time to verdict

Page

HTTP
200 · Completed
Title
Download Claude | Claude by Anthropic
Load
3.19 s · 6 requests
Stack · 5CloudflareCloudflare Browser InsightsHTTP/3Open GraphWebflow