Scan report · 20 days agoScanned from TRPublic

codex-desk.com

188.114.97.1AS13335 · US

Suspicious: the page is holding a shell command whose download address is hidden inside base64, in a slot the visitor never sees until a copy button lifts it (ClickFix)

Verdict

What happened

Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.
Load 3.0 s · 22 requests
01 · Visitor openscodex-desk.com
02 · Page shown
Codex | AI Coding Partner from OpenAI | OpenAIstyled as OpenAI · medium
03 · Clipboard seededA command copied to the clipboardThe text is under findings, behind a warning. It was never run.
04 · OutcomeThe visitor runs the payload themselvesPaste, Enter — no download and no login form for a filter to catch.

Dangerous — confirmed threat

Automated

Its page title claims to be OpenAI, which this address is not associated with. Its web address was registered only one day before this scan (on 2026-09-13) — most phishing sites run on brand-new domains. It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.

What to do

Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.

This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.

Findings

Strongest first
ClickFixClickFix: the page is holding a command that hides the address it downloads from

The lure never opened for us — it sits where our click could not reach it. We decoded the command out of the page's own code instead, in bytes this scan fetched.

Live attacker command — do not run this

This is the exact text the page instructs a visitor to run. Pasting it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R), PowerShell, or any terminal will execute the attacker's payload on your machine. Urlyze decoded it out of the page's own code and never executed it.

Nothing was copied and no gate was passed in this scan. The command below was found in a container the browser neither shows nor runs (script:text/plain) — which is the slot the page's own "copy" button lifts from when a visitor opens its install dialog. Its download address is base64-encoded, so a visitor can read the whole line and still not know what it contacts; legitimate installers print that address in plain text. Nothing was executed.

Analyst noteDECODE THE BASE64 FIRST — the host inside it is the payload address and the IOC to pivot on, not the domain you are looking at. There is no instruction screenshot and no clipboard capture for this one: the page was caught HOLDING the command, not delivering it, so treat the delivery step as inferred from markup rather than observed. If the same host serves a different page to a non-datacenter visitor, re-scan from another egress. Nothing was executed.

InfoBrand impersonation detected
OpenAI · medium

The page presents itself as a known brand (brand keywords/branding detected).

Analyst noteLow/medium confidence (keyword only) — can be a news article or partner page. Corroborate before acting.

Infrastructure

IP
188.114.97.1CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc., US · AS13335US
TLS
CN=YE2, O=Let's Encrypt, C=US · expires Dec 12, 2026

WHOIS

Registrar
NICENIC INTERNATIONAL GROUP CO., LIMITED
Created
Sep 13, 2026
Expires
Sep 13, 2027
Nameservers
janet.ns.cloudflare.comkeaton.ns.cloudflare.com
122 malicious15 suspicious

Hashes & fingerprints

Page capture

Live

Title “Codex | AI Coding Partner from OpenAI | OpenAI” · brand shown: OpenAI (medium)

Engines

9 · time to verdict

Page

HTTP
200 · Completed
Title
Codex | AI Coding Partner from OpenAI | OpenAI
Load
3.03 s · 22 requests
Stack · 3CloudflareCloudflare Browser InsightsHTTP/3