grupotahona.es
185.66.41.19AS197712 · ESAn interaction gate (e.g. Cloudflare Turnstile) blocked full analysis, but a detection rule identified this page anyway. The pre-gate score below rates only what was visible before the gate — not the evidence this verdict rests on.
page copied a hidden shell-invocation command to the visitor's clipboard behind an anti-bot gate (ClickFix)
Full command shown, with a warning, under findings
- Content Inspectionmalicious
- Threat Intelligencemalicious
- Browser Analysismalicious
- Network & Hostingclean
- TLS Fingerprintunknown
- Domain Intelligenceunknown
What happened
Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.Dangerous — confirmed threat
Preliminary / could not fully loadIt shows a bot-check screen that it draws itself — it copies a protection provider's wording but never contacts that provider. It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. The file it serves was analysed and found malicious. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.
What to do
Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.
This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.
Findings
Strongest firstOur Content Inspection engine downloaded the file this URL serves and analyzed it as a real payload — it matched known malware. Do not open or run this file.
Success
SHA-256 a578bd904cfd045ad41c00f05581f9bf816436ddfb79021282f745b668708b84
The page never showed this command to the visitor — it silently placed it on their clipboard and instructed them to paste and run something they could not read. The victim executes the attacker's payload themselves; no download or login form is needed.
Our probe obtained it by pressing the fake verification widget on a throwaway copy of the page — the page did not hand it over on load.
Live attacker command — do not run this
This is the exact text the page silently placed on a visitor's clipboard. Pasting it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R), PowerShell, or any terminal will execute the attacker's payload on your machine. Urlyze captured it inside an isolated browser and never executed it.
The page silently placed a shell command on the visitor's clipboard and told them to paste it into the Run dialog — the ClickFix technique. The command is NOT shown anywhere on the page, so the victim runs something they were never allowed to read.
What the victim is shown after clicking Verify (captured on a throwaway copy).
Analyst noteTreat the copied command as the payload — read it for the download URL, the dead-drop (Telegram/blockchain) and the execution method. It never runs in our sandbox; nothing was executed.
The page put a human-verification challenge (Turnstile/reCAPTCHA/hCaptcha) in front of a redirect that leaves for a different domain. Automated analysis can't clear the challenge, so the redirect target was read from the page's own script instead. The challenge here is cloaking, not site security.
Analyst noteThe redirect target is the real landing — pivot on it. A legitimate site does not hide a cross-domain redirect behind a CAPTCHA it embedded itself. Especially strong when the carrier is object storage, the target is http, or affiliate/TDS params ride the URL.
The page shows a challenge-provider logo (Cloudflare, reCAPTCHA…) that it fetched from www.straightsell.com.au, and it never contacted that provider's challenge infrastructure — a real Cloudflare or reCAPTCHA gate serves its own assets and talks back to its own servers. Also: the page prints “checking if you are human”. This is the ClickFix family's costume stage: the fake gate whose checkbox press is what places the command on the clipboard. On the sample this rule was written for, the checkbox press produced no command on that run — this kit withholds it per visit — which is why the costume itself has to count.
Analyst noteOpen the asset URL: a provider logo served from an unrelated (usually compromised) site is the kit's shared infrastructure — pivot on it, every page loading it is the same kit. Re-scan later for the command; the payload rotates per visit.
A bot-protection challenge (e.g. Cloudflare Turnstile) blocked full analysis, so the verdict relies on pre-gate evidence (see the Gated Risk Assessment).
Analyst noteThe gate alone is NOT suspicious — many legitimate sites use it. Read the Gated Risk Assessment for the actual pre-gate risk.
Gated Risk Assessment
This page sits behind a bot-protection gate, but it was already identified by a detection rule — see the verdict reason for what fired. The score below reflects ONLY the weak pre-gate signals (score 0) and does not override that finding.
Pre-gate signals
No pre-gate risk signals detected.
Path to gate (1 hops)
Infrastructure
- IP
- 185.66.41.19CDmon - 10dencehispahard, S.L., ES · AS197712ES
- TLS
- CN=YR2, O=Let's Encrypt, C=US · expires Nov 28, 2026
- Redirects
- 0 hops · / → /
Hashes & fingerprints
Page capture
LiveTitle “Checking if you are human”
Engines
6 · time to verdictPage
- HTTP
- 200 · AntiBotChallenged
- Title
- Checking if you are human
- Load
- 26.28 s · 5 requests