Scan report · about 2 months agoPublic

inlogsysmx.com.mx

162.241.61.123AS31898 · US
Engine tags
Verdict

What happened

Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.
Load 14.0 s · 14 requests
01 · Visitor opensinlogsysmx.com.mx/ftx/
02 · Redirected · 1 hopSame host, another address/ftx/lqn1r4-1786619003-66476…pS7ppj2qfFvdQ0I%2FNi1snEAlS
03 · Page shown
e-signstyled as DocuSign · low
04 · Data sent toapi.telegram.org/bot<redacted>/...
05 · OutcomeWhatever is typed leaves the pageA collection endpoint was observed; anything entered is treated as exposed.

Dangerous — confirmed threat

Automated

Its page title claims to be DocuSign, which this address is not associated with. What you type is sent to telegram — a route attackers use to collect stolen details. It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.

What to do

Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.

This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.

Findings

Strongest first
StrongCredential-exfiltration endpoint detected
telegram: api.telegram.org/bot<redacted>/...

The page contacted an endpoint used to steal entered data (e.g. a Telegram bot, Discord webhook, or request-catcher). Legitimate sites never send form data to these services.

Analyst noteDefinitive: Telegram/Discord/request-proxy exfil = credential theft. Treat as malicious; capture the endpoint for an IOC/takedown.

SupportingPage delivers a remote-management installer (ScreenConnect)
https://equipodecervezaelmoe.screenconnect.com/Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi?e=Access&y=Guest · document pretext ("docusign")

The page's download button hands the visitor ScreenConnect, a genuine remote-control product, while presenting itself as a document. Once run it gives an outsider live control of the machine. The installer is validly signed by its real vendor, so antivirus and file-analysis engines correctly see nothing wrong with the file — the attack is the pretext, not the payload.

Analyst noteRMM abuse: the payload is a legitimate signed ScreenConnect client, so file reputation will be clean by design — do not read that as a false positive. The tenant hostname and the query parameters in the target URL identify the attacker's relay and are the IOC + the abuse-report target (report to the RMM vendor, not only to the hosting provider).

InfoBrand impersonation detected
DocuSign · low

The page presents itself as a known brand (brand keywords/branding detected).

Analyst noteLow/medium confidence (keyword only) — can be a news article or partner page. Corroborate before acting.

File

The file was not analysed, so the scan carries no verdict on the file itself.

Infrastructure

IP
162.241.61.123ORACLE-BMC-31898 - Oracle Corporation, US · AS31898US
TLS
CN=YR1, O=Let's Encrypt, C=US · expires Sep 22, 2026
Redirects
1 hop · /ftx/ → /ftx/lqn1r4-1786619003-66476…pS7ppj2qfFvdQ0I%2FNi1snEAlS
26 malicious5 suspicious

Hashes & fingerprints

Page capture

Live

Title “e-sign” · brand shown: DocuSign (low)

Engines

8 · time to verdict

Page

HTTP
200 · Completed
Title
e-sign
Load
14.00 s · 14 requests
Stack · 2NginxPHP