Scan report · 18 days agoPublic

yumppad.com

160.153.0.54AS209242 · US

page copied a hidden remote-installer command to the visitor's clipboard (ClickFix)

Clipboard command reachesactivityof.com

Full command shown, with a warning, under findings

Engine tags
Verdict

What happened

Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.
Load 5.5 s · 87 requests
01 · Visitor opensyumppad.com
02 · Page shown
YumpPad – Yump to your perfect pad today!
03 · Clipboard seeded · hiddenA command the visitor never seesremote-installerThe text is under findings, behind a warning. It was never run.
04 · OutcomeThe visitor runs the payload themselvesPaste, Enter — no download and no login form for a filter to catch.

Dangerous — confirmed threat

Automated

It asks you to enter a password. It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.

What to do

Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.

This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.

Findings

Strongest first
ClickFixClickFix: a HIDDEN command was copied to the clipboardremote-installer

The page never showed this command to the visitor — it silently placed it on their clipboard and instructed them to paste and run something they could not read. The victim executes the attacker's payload themselves; no download or login form is needed.

Our probe obtained it by pressing the fake verification widget on a throwaway copy of the page — the page did not hand it over on load.

Live attacker command — do not run this

This is the exact text the page silently placed on a visitor's clipboard. Pasting it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R), PowerShell, or any terminal will execute the attacker's payload on your machine. Urlyze captured it inside an isolated browser and never executed it.

The page silently placed a shell command on the visitor's clipboard and told them to paste it into the Run dialog — the ClickFix technique. The command is NOT shown anywhere on the page, so the victim runs something they were never allowed to read.

What the victim is shown after clicking Verify (captured on a throwaway copy).

Analyst noteTreat the copied command as the payload — read it for the download URL, the dead-drop (Telegram/blockchain) and the execution method. It never runs in our sandbox; nothing was executed.

StrongFake verification gate wearing a provider's branding
https://www.straightsell.com.au/documents/AddOns/cloudflare-logo-main.png

The page shows a challenge-provider logo (Cloudflare, reCAPTCHA…) that it fetched from www.straightsell.com.au, and it never contacted that provider's challenge infrastructure — a real Cloudflare or reCAPTCHA gate serves its own assets and talks back to its own servers. Also: the page prints “verify you are human”. This is the ClickFix family's costume stage: the fake gate whose checkbox press is what places the command on the clipboard. On the sample this rule was written for, our probe pressed that checkbox and the kit withheld the command for that run, which is why the costume itself has to count.

Analyst noteOpen the asset URL: a provider logo served from an unrelated (usually compromised) site is the kit's shared infrastructure — pivot on it, every page loading it is the same kit. Re-scan later for the command; the payload rotates per visit.

SupportingFaked CDN 'checking your browser' page
yumppad.com

The page reproduces a CDN challenge interstitial (e.g. Cloudflare's 'Just a moment…') inside a hosted file, rather than being served by that CDN's edge. It is a lure skin used to make a redirect look like a routine security check.

Analyst noteA genuine Cloudflare/DDoS-Guard challenge is served by the CDN, not uploaded to object storage. Treat the faked chrome as a delivery signal, especially alongside a gated cross-origin redirect.

InfoCross-domain scripts injected at runtime
2 script(s)

The page dynamically injected scripts from other domains. This is extremely common on legitimate sites (CDNs, analytics, asset domains) and is shown for context only.

Analyst noteNoisy by itself — a CDN/asset domain (e.g. a brand's own *.githubassets.com) is normal. Only meaningful if the source domain is unrelated/suspicious.

Infrastructure

IP
160.153.0.54CLOUDFLARESPECTRUM - Cloudflare London, LLC, US · AS209242US
TLS
CN=WE1, O=Google Trust Services, C=US · expires Nov 6, 2026

WHOIS

Registrar
GoDaddy.com, LLC
Created
Apr 4, 2024
Expires
Apr 4, 2028
Nameservers
ns75.domaincontrol.comns76.domaincontrol.com
120 malicious9 suspicious

Hashes & fingerprints

Page capture

Live

Title “YumpPad – Yump to your perfect pad today!”

Engines

7 · time to verdict

Page

HTTP
200 · Completed
Title
YumpPad – Yump to your perfect pad today!
Load
5.49 s · 87 requests
Stack · 18Amazon ALBBootstrapcdnjsCloudflareCloudflare Bot ManagementHTTP/3