ktrced.top
203.91.72.250AS400619 · HKthis page poses as a security check (its markup matches the catalogued phishing kit "FKRC Fake reCAPTCHA ClickFix"), tells the desktop visitor the check cannot be completed here ("This site isn't available on desktop.") and hands them https://ktrced.top/ to open on a phone as a QR code it draws and through a copy-link button, in the x-safari scheme that forces iOS to open it in Safari. A genuine check never depends on the visitor's device; a page that insists on a phone is filtering for the device its payload targets. Opened as an iPhone, the same address showed requests to 1 host the desktop never contacted (92haoyun.icu)
- Browser Analysis● malicious
- Threat Intelligence● malicious
- DNS Reputation● maliciousPotentially Unwanted Content
- Open Directory Scan● malicious
- Content Inspection● clean
- Network & Hosting● clean
- Related Infrastructure● clean
- TLS Fingerprint● unknown
- Domain Intelligence● unknown
- Lexical Url Heuristic● unknown
Dangerous: confirmed threat
Automated- 01It calls itself a security check, says the check cannot be done on a computer, and hands you its own address to open on your phone in Safari. A genuine check never depends on your device; the phone is where the real page is served.
- 02It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds.
- 03A DNS-security service categorises this domain as "Potentially Unwanted Content".
What to do
Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.
This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.
What happened
Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.Findings
Strongest firstThis page poses as a security check: its markup matches the catalogued phishing kit "FKRC Fake reCAPTCHA ClickFix". It tells the desktop visitor: "This site isn't available on desktop." It then hands over the address above through a QR code drawn on the page and a copy-link button that writes it to the clipboard. The QR uses the x-safari-https:// scheme, which makes an iPhone open the address in Safari itself rather than in the camera's or an app's in-app browser. A security check has no reason to insist on one browser engine; an exploit chain does. A genuine check never depends on the visitor's device: Cloudflare, reCAPTCHA and Turnstile all complete on a desktop. A check that can only be completed on a phone is a device filter. The page the phone is served is the real one, and the desktop sees a shell. Opened as an iPhone, the same address showed requests to 1 host the desktop never contacted (92haoyun.icu).
Opened as an iPhone
Hosts only the phone contacted
- 92haoyun[.]icu
Analyst noteOpen the address on an isolated phone or a mobile-emulating sandbox, never on a personal device: on the sample this family's mobile branch was an iOS exploit loader in a 0×0 frame that fires only for a specific iOS version. The desktop render holds no payload, so a desktop-only re-scan will keep saying Clean. The phone-leg fields (MobileHandoffRender*) say what an iPhone persona was shown: a gate, a form, a download, and the hosts only the phone contacted. Those hosts are the pivot. Block the address and the mobile-only hosts together.
We asked this host for a short list of paths that a correctly deployed site never answers, and it served them: the kit's own archive, its credential or session log, or a source/secret file. These are the operator's working files, left readable by anyone.
Analyst noteOpen each path shown above before it disappears: a credential or session log names the victims, an exfil config names where the stolen data goes, and an archive usually contains the whole kit. Capture them as evidence for the takedown; this host is reachable by everyone else too.
Infrastructure
- IP
- 203.91.72.250AROSS-AS - AROSSCLOUD INC., US · AS400619HK
- TLS
- CN=LiteSSL RSA CA 2025, O="TrustAsia Technologies, Inc.", C=CN · expires Feb 1, 2027
WHOIS
- Registrar
- Spaceship, Inc.
- Country
- US
- Created
- Aug 6, 2026
- Expires
- Aug 6, 2027
- Nameservers
- launch2.spaceship.net.launch1.spaceship.net.
Hashes & fingerprints
Page capture
LiveEngines
10 · time to verdictPage
- HTTP
- 200 · Completed
- Load
- 16.48 s · 10 requests