Scan report · 8 days agoPublic

ikcs.com.tn

54.36.31.145AS16276 · FR

page hides a command-execution instruction from the visitor

a shell is opened, the clipboard is pasted and run, and none of it is on screen until something is clicked (ClickFix)
Engine tags
Verdict

What happened

Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.
Load 17.5 s · 112 requests
01 · Visitor opensikcs.com.tn
02 · Page shown
IKCS | Coffret Collecteur Métallique
03 · OutcomeThe visitor runs the payload themselvesPaste, Enter — no download and no login form for a filter to catch.

Dangerous — confirmed threat

Automated

It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.

What to do

Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.

This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.

Findings

Strongest first
StrongClickFix: a hidden execution instruction — no command was served on this visit
nothing was copied

The page carries a complete execution instruction the visitor cannot see. The lure did not open on this visit, so the picture below is the page before any interaction, not the instruction screen; no command was obtained. Either way the page IS instructing a visitor to run something through the Windows Run dialog, in text it does not show them.

Analyst noteLook at the screenshot — the on-screen steps and any verification ID are the evidence here. A missing command usually means the kit's panel was down, region-gated, or its own template was broken; re-scan later or from another egress to obtain it. Nothing was executed.

StrongFake verification gate wearing a provider's branding
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/94/Cloudflare_Logo.png

The page shows a challenge-provider logo (Cloudflare, reCAPTCHA…) that it fetched from upload.wikimedia.org, and it never contacted that provider's challenge infrastructure — a real Cloudflare or reCAPTCHA gate serves its own assets and talks back to its own servers. Also: the page printed no stock challenge wording our text capture could reach. This is the ClickFix family's costume stage: the fake gate whose checkbox press is what places the command on the clipboard. On the sample this rule was written for, the checkbox press produced no command on that run — this kit withholds it per visit — which is why the costume itself has to count.

Analyst noteOpen the asset URL: a provider logo served from an unrelated (usually compromised) site is the kit's shared infrastructure — pivot on it, every page loading it is the same kit. Re-scan later for the command; the payload rotates per visit.

StrongCommand-and-control read from a blockchain node (EtherHiding)
polygon.drpc.org, polygon-bor-rpc.publicnode.com, polygon.lava.build, polygon.rpc.subquery.network

The page fetched instructions from a public blockchain RPC node while showing the visitor nothing to do with crypto — no wallet, no token, no exchange. The next stage is held in a smart contract instead of on a server, so it survives domain takedowns and can be rewritten by its operator at any time. ⚠️ What this does NOT say: the contract's contents were not read, and the payload it returned — if any — is recorded separately when a later stage delivers it.

Analyst notePivot on these nodes and on the contract address in the request bodies. A page with no crypto surface has no legitimate reason to read a chain.

SupportingPage copied an empty string to the clipboard
writeText

The page performed a copy-to-clipboard step and the copied text was empty. ClickFix kits fetch their command from a control panel rather than carrying it in the page, so an empty copy means no command was in the page at that moment. Whether the panel answered without one, or had not been asked yet, is not something this scan observed.

Analyst noteAbsence of the command on the clipboard is NOT absence of the technique. Check whether the page also prints Run-dialog instructions, and whether a payload request came back 200 with an empty body — that response is the discriminator between a panel that served nothing and a copy step that ran too early.

Infrastructure

IP
54.36.31.145OVH - OVH SAS, FR · AS16276FR
TLS
CN=YE1, O=Let's Encrypt, C=US · expires Dec 3, 2026
Redirects
0 hops · / → /
75 malicious13 suspicious

Hashes & fingerprints

Page capture

Live

Title “IKCS | Coffret Collecteur Métallique”

Engines

7 · time to verdict

Page

HTTP
200 · Completed
Title
IKCS | Coffret Collecteur Métallique
Load
17.52 s · 112 requests
Stack · 15Apache HTTP ServerCloudflare Browser InsightsContact Form 7ElementorGoogle AnalyticsGoogle Tag Manager