smgjamat.in
108.167.136.54AS31898 · USpage copied a hidden remote-installer command to the visitor's clipboard (ClickFix)
Full command shown, with a warning, under findings
- Browser Analysismalicious
- Threat Intelligencemalicious
- Content Inspectionsuspicious
- Network & Hostingclean
- Related Infrastructureclean
- Domain Intelligenceunknown
- TLS Fingerprintunknown
What happened
Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.Dangerous — confirmed threat
AutomatedIt is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.
What to do
Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.
This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.
Findings
Strongest firstOur Content Inspection engine downloaded the file this URL serves and analyzed it. The payload shows traits commonly seen in malware. Treat it as unsafe until verified.
Success
SHA-256 a076acea6ddac7a7f88cc1874a73ccaf1fc7c26d6b9936d12e62287775f47acb
The page never showed this command to the visitor — it silently placed it on their clipboard and instructed them to paste and run something they could not read. The victim executes the attacker's payload themselves; no download or login form is needed.
Our probe obtained it by pressing the fake verification widget on a throwaway copy of the page — the page did not hand it over on load.
Live attacker command — do not run this
This is the exact text the page silently placed on a visitor's clipboard. Pasting it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R), PowerShell, or any terminal will execute the attacker's payload on your machine. Urlyze captured it inside an isolated browser and never executed it.
The page silently placed a shell command on the visitor's clipboard and told them to paste it into the Run dialog — the ClickFix technique. The command is NOT shown anywhere on the page, so the victim runs something they were never allowed to read.
What the victim is shown after clicking Verify (captured on a throwaway copy).
Analyst noteTreat the copied command as the payload — read it for the download URL, the dead-drop (Telegram/blockchain) and the execution method. It never runs in our sandbox; nothing was executed.
The page fetched instructions from a public blockchain RPC node while showing the visitor nothing to do with crypto — no wallet, no token, no exchange. The next stage is held in a smart contract instead of on a server, so it survives domain takedowns and can be rewritten by its operator at any time. ⚠️ What this does NOT say: the contract's contents were not read, and the payload it returned — if any — is recorded separately when a later stage delivers it.
Analyst notePivot on these nodes and on the contract address in the request bodies. A page with no crypto surface has no legitimate reason to read a chain.
The page's structure/assets match a catalogued phishing kit — pre-built attacker software for cloning a brand's login.
Analyst noteKit rated high, corroborated by an outbound request to the kit's OWN infrastructure on another host — that is the kit running here, not a page that mentions it. 🔴 Do not go looking for a brand match, an exfil endpoint or a form-action mismatch: this is a clipboard-delivery family, it never renders a form, and all six harvesting legs are absent by design — their absence is not evidence against the match. Already observed on this scan: a fake verification gate · a decoded command · a clipboard write · an address its own code names (https://www.gstatic.com/recaptcha/api2/logo_48.png).
A script was loaded from an in-memory blob:/data: URL, so its source never appears in network traffic — a common CSP/analysis-evasion technique.
Analyst noteRare on legitimate sites. Pair with decoded-then-executed payload or injected scripts to confirm obfuscation.
The page dynamically injected scripts from other domains. This is extremely common on legitimate sites (CDNs, analytics, asset domains) and is shown for context only.
Analyst noteNoisy by itself — a CDN/asset domain (e.g. a brand's own *.githubassets.com) is normal. Only meaningful if the source domain is unrelated/suspicious.
Infrastructure
- IP
- 108.167.136.54ORACLE-BMC-31898 - Oracle Corporation, US · AS31898US
- TLS
- CN=YR1, O=Let's Encrypt, C=US · expires Dec 15, 2026
WHOIS
- Registrar
- Endurance International Group India Private Limited
- Organization
- GB Services
- Country
- IN
- Created
- Aug 28, 2023
- Expires
- Aug 28, 2027
- Nameservers
- ns1.eventionzmedia.inns2.eventionzmedia.in
Hashes & fingerprints
Page capture
LiveTitle “Sorathiya Muslim Ghanchi Jamat”
Engines
7 · time to verdictPage
- HTTP
- 200 · Completed
- Title
- Sorathiya Muslim Ghanchi Jamat
- Load
- 5.14 s · 85 requests