zenteambuilding.com
72.61.230.213AS47583 · LTpage copied a hidden unix-shell-pipe command to the visitor's clipboard (ClickFix)
- Browser Analysismalicious
- Threat Intelligencemalicious
- Content Inspectionclean
- URL Scannerclean
- Network & Hostingclean
- Related Infrastructureclean
- TLS Fingerprintunknown
- Url Reputationunknown
- +1 more below
What happened
Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.Dangerous — confirmed threat
AutomatedIt is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.
What to do
Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.
This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.
Findings
Strongest firstThe page never showed this command to the visitor — it silently placed it on their clipboard and instructed them to paste and run something they could not read. The victim executes the attacker's payload themselves; no download or login form is needed.
Our probe obtained it by pressing the fake verification widget on a throwaway copy of the page — the page did not hand it over on load.
Live attacker command — do not run this
This is the exact text the page silently placed on a visitor's clipboard. Pasting it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R), PowerShell, or any terminal will execute the attacker's payload on your machine. Urlyze captured it inside an isolated browser and never executed it.
The page silently placed a shell command on the visitor's clipboard and told them to paste it into the Run dialog — the ClickFix technique. The command is NOT shown anywhere on the page, so the victim runs something they were never allowed to read.
What the victim is shown after clicking Verify (captured on a throwaway copy).
Analyst noteTreat the copied command as the payload — read it for the download URL, the dead-drop (Telegram/blockchain) and the execution method. It never runs in our sandbox; nothing was executed.
The page's structure/assets match a catalogued phishing kit — pre-built attacker software for cloning a brand's login.
Analyst noteKit rated high, corroborated by an outbound request to the kit's OWN infrastructure on another host — that is the kit running here, not a page that mentions it. 🔴 Do not go looking for a brand match, an exfil endpoint or a form-action mismatch: this is a clipboard-delivery family, it never renders a form, and all six harvesting legs are absent by design — their absence is not evidence against the match. Already observed on this scan: a decoded command · a clipboard write · an address its own code names (http://62.60.156.226/6c5c3cb8a9b?force=1).
The page dynamically injected scripts from other domains. This is extremely common on legitimate sites (CDNs, analytics, asset domains) and is shown for context only.
Analyst noteNoisy by itself — a CDN/asset domain (e.g. a brand's own *.githubassets.com) is normal. Only meaningful if the source domain is unrelated/suspicious.
Infrastructure
- IP
- 72.61.230.213AS-HOSTINGER - Hostinger International Limited, CY · AS47583LT
- TLS
- CN=YE2, O=Let's Encrypt, C=US · expires Nov 16, 2026
- Redirects
- 0 hops · / → /
WHOIS
- Registrar
- GoDaddy.com, LLC
- Created
- Apr 26, 2023
- Expires
- Apr 26, 2028
- Nameservers
- aster.dns-parking.comhelios.dns-parking.com
Hashes & fingerprints
Page capture
LiveTitle “Zen Team Building”
Engines
9 · time to verdictPage
- HTTP
- 200 · Completed
- Title
- Zen Team Building
- Load
- 12.77 s · 196 requests