jdsw.alico.shop
188.114.96.1AS13335 · USpage delivers the program ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi (https://jdsw.alico.shop…p.msi?e=Access&y=Guest)
- Browser Analysismalicious
- Content Inspectionclean
- Threat Intelligenceclean
- Network & Hostingclean
- Related Infrastructureclean
- Delivered fileclean
- Domain Intelligenceunknown
- TLS Fingerprintunknown
Dangerous — confirmed threat
AutomatedWe found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.
What to do
Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.
This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.
What happened
Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.Findings
Strongest firstThe page automatically triggered a file download. Normal landing pages don't do this; malware droppers do.
Analyst noteCheck the file name/type. An auto-download of an executable or archive is a strong malware-delivery tell.
This address serves an installer that carries the ScreenConnect agent's own component names in its contents ("ScreenConnect.WindowsBackstageShell.exe"), under a name that says nothing about it. Remote-management tools are legitimate software, and it is not being served from ScreenConnect's own address; what makes this an attack is that a visitor is given one under a different pretext, so the attacker ends up with remote control of the machine.
Analyst noteThis name came out of the delivered bytes themselves — nothing opened or unpacked the file, so treat it as a strong hint about WHICH tool, not as proof of what the installer does. The page offered an update and the download is named after it, which is why neither mentions ScreenConnect. ⚠️ Expect the installer to be signed and to analyse Clean, because it IS the real product; the abuse is the pretext and the tenant it enrols into. Check that tenant before assuming it is not yours.
The page's download button hands the visitor ScreenConnect, a genuine remote-control product, while presenting itself as a document. Once run it gives an outsider live control of the machine. The installer is validly signed by its real vendor, so antivirus and file-analysis engines correctly see nothing wrong with the file — the attack is the pretext, not the payload.
Analyst noteRMM abuse: the payload is a legitimate signed ScreenConnect client, so file reputation will be clean by design — do not read that as a false positive. The tenant hostname and the query parameters in the target URL identify the attacker's relay and are the IOC + the abuse-report target (report to the RMM vendor, not only to the hosting provider).
File
Stored by the engineWhat you download may be live malware. Open it only in an isolated environment, and do not double-click it.
The ZIP is encrypted. Password:infected
Inside the ZIP the file carries a name the engine generated, not the one the page used.
Downloaded fileCleanThe engine stored it under a generated name
SHA-256b7612dbce96462ef6d8c3086c6ffb5b6190aee5552502a9d83b5a34a5ddb57cf
Fromhxxps://jdsw[.]alico[.]shop/Bin/ScreenConnect[.]ClientSetup[.]msi?e=Access&y=Guest
Infrastructure
- IP
- 188.114.96.1CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc., US · AS13335US
- TLS
- CN=YE2, O=Let's Encrypt, C=US · expires Jan 15, 2027
- Redirects
- 0 hops · /Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi?e=Access&y=Guest → blank
WHOIS
- Registrar
- Namecheap, Inc.
- Created
- Aug 31, 2026
- Expires
- Aug 31, 2027
- Nameservers
- cora.ns.cloudflare.comowen.ns.cloudflare.com