Scan report · 7 days agoPublic

cloudfiare-verification.net

172.67.204.110AS13335 · US

page copied a hidden shell-invocation command to the visitor's clipboard (ClickFix). Clipboard command reaches: cloudfiare.io

Full command shown, with a warning, under findings

Engine tags
Verdict

Dangerous: confirmed threat

Automated
  1. 01Its web address was registered only one day before this scan (on 2026-11-08). Most phishing sites run on brand-new domains.
  2. 02It silently places a command on your clipboard, one it never shows you, and tells you to paste and run it yourself. That command downloads and runs a program on your computer (the ClickFix technique).
  3. 03It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds.

What to do

Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.

This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.

What happened

Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.
Load 9.6 s · 3 requests
01 · Visitor openscloudfiare-verification.net
02 · Page shown
cloudfiare-verification.net
03 · Clipboard seeded · hiddenA command the visitor never seesshell-invocationThe text is under findings, behind a warning. It was never run.
04 · OutcomeThe visitor runs the payload themselvesPaste, Enter: no download and no login form for a filter to catch.

Findings

Strongest first
Suspicious fileSuspicious content in the downloaded file
index.html

Our Content Inspection engine downloaded the file this URL serves and analyzed it. The payload shows traits commonly seen in malware. Treat it as unsafe until verified.

Success

SHA-256 b14bae4cd8bd42636936014829419802631a6a62dd530f5f2ffeb2d65ffb2efb

ClickFixClickFix: a HIDDEN command was copied to the clipboardshell-invocation

The page never showed this command to the visitor. It silently placed it on their clipboard and instructed them to paste and run something they could not read. The victim executes the attacker's payload themselves; no download or login form is needed.

Our probe obtained it by pressing the control the page's markup declares around its verification text (“Verify you are human CLOUDFLARE Privacy · Terms”) on a throwaway copy of the page; the page did not hand it over on load.

The page silently placed a shell command on the visitor's clipboard. This is the ClickFix technique, which relies on the visitor pasting it and pressing Enter themselves. The command is NOT shown anywhere on the page, so the victim runs something they were never allowed to read.

Analyst noteTreat the copied command as the payload: read it for the download URL, the dead-drop (Telegram/blockchain) and the execution method. It never runs in our sandbox; nothing was executed.

StrongFake verification gate wearing a provider's branding
https://shatamilo.com/cloudflare/api?t=f5b9247341e748b0c21c914ea5b24014c52f4ba9&track=1&event=os&t=f5b9247341e748b0c21c914ea5b24014c52f4ba9&domain=cloudfiare-verification.net&os=windows

The page shows a challenge-provider logo (Cloudflare, reCAPTCHA…) that it fetched from shatamilo.com, and it never contacted that provider's challenge infrastructure. A real Cloudflare or reCAPTCHA gate serves its own assets and talks back to its own servers. Also: the page printed no stock challenge wording our text capture could reach. This is the ClickFix family's costume stage: the fake gate whose checkbox press is what places the command on the clipboard. On the sample this rule was written for, the checkbox press produced no command on that run (this kit withholds it per visit), which is why the costume itself has to count.

Analyst noteOpen the asset URL: a provider logo served from an unrelated (usually compromised) site is the kit's shared infrastructure. Pivot on it: every page loading it is the same kit. Re-scan later for the command; the payload rotates per visit.

Infrastructure

IP
172.67.204.110CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc., US · AS13335US
TLS
CN=YE2, O=Let's Encrypt, C=US · expires Feb 6, 2027
Redirects
0 hops · / → /

WHOIS

Registrar
NICENIC INTERNATIONAL GROUP CO., LIMITED
Created
Nov 8, 2026
Expires
Nov 8, 2027
Nameservers
fay.ns.cloudflare.comjohnny.ns.cloudflare.com
Related scans · 84+
47 malicious9 suspicious26 clean2 unknown

Hashes & fingerprints

Page capture

Live

Engines

8 · time to verdict

Page

HTTP
200 · Completed
Load
9.63 s · 3 requests
Stack · 2CloudflareHTTP/3