cloudfiare-verification.net
172.67.204.110AS13335 · USpage copied a hidden shell-invocation command to the visitor's clipboard (ClickFix). Clipboard command reaches: cloudfiare.io
Full command shown, with a warning, under findings
- Browser Analysis● malicious
- Threat Intelligence● malicious
- Content Inspection● suspicious
- Domain Intelligence● suspicious
- DNS Reputation● cleanNewly Registered Domain
- Network & Hosting● clean
- Related Infrastructure● clean
- TLS Fingerprint● unknown
Dangerous: confirmed threat
Automated- 01Its web address was registered only one day before this scan (on 2026-11-08). Most phishing sites run on brand-new domains.
- 02It silently places a command on your clipboard, one it never shows you, and tells you to paste and run it yourself. That command downloads and runs a program on your computer (the ClickFix technique).
- 03It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds.
What to do
Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.
This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.
What happened
Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.Findings
Strongest firstOur Content Inspection engine downloaded the file this URL serves and analyzed it. The payload shows traits commonly seen in malware. Treat it as unsafe until verified.
Success
SHA-256 b14bae4cd8bd42636936014829419802631a6a62dd530f5f2ffeb2d65ffb2efb
The page never showed this command to the visitor. It silently placed it on their clipboard and instructed them to paste and run something they could not read. The victim executes the attacker's payload themselves; no download or login form is needed.
Our probe obtained it by pressing the control the page's markup declares around its verification text (“Verify you are human CLOUDFLARE Privacy · Terms”) on a throwaway copy of the page; the page did not hand it over on load.
The page silently placed a shell command on the visitor's clipboard. This is the ClickFix technique, which relies on the visitor pasting it and pressing Enter themselves. The command is NOT shown anywhere on the page, so the victim runs something they were never allowed to read.
Analyst noteTreat the copied command as the payload: read it for the download URL, the dead-drop (Telegram/blockchain) and the execution method. It never runs in our sandbox; nothing was executed.
The page shows a challenge-provider logo (Cloudflare, reCAPTCHA…) that it fetched from shatamilo.com, and it never contacted that provider's challenge infrastructure. A real Cloudflare or reCAPTCHA gate serves its own assets and talks back to its own servers. Also: the page printed no stock challenge wording our text capture could reach. This is the ClickFix family's costume stage: the fake gate whose checkbox press is what places the command on the clipboard. On the sample this rule was written for, the checkbox press produced no command on that run (this kit withholds it per visit), which is why the costume itself has to count.
Analyst noteOpen the asset URL: a provider logo served from an unrelated (usually compromised) site is the kit's shared infrastructure. Pivot on it: every page loading it is the same kit. Re-scan later for the command; the payload rotates per visit.
Infrastructure
- IP
- 172.67.204.110CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc., US · AS13335US
- TLS
- CN=YE2, O=Let's Encrypt, C=US · expires Feb 6, 2027
- Redirects
- 0 hops · / → /
WHOIS
- Registrar
- NICENIC INTERNATIONAL GROUP CO., LIMITED
- Created
- Nov 8, 2026
- Expires
- Nov 8, 2027
- Nameservers
- fay.ns.cloudflare.comjohnny.ns.cloudflare.com
Hashes & fingerprints
Page capture
LiveEngines
8 · time to verdictPage
- HTTP
- 200 · Completed
- Load
- 9.63 s · 3 requests