idyeahcentral.com
198.251.89.144AS53667 · USpage copied a hidden download-execute command to the visitor's clipboard (ClickFix)
Full command shown, with a warning, under findings
- Browser Analysismalicious
- Threat Intelligencemalicious
- Content Inspectionsuspicious
- Network & Hostingclean
- Related Infrastructureclean
- TLS Fingerprintunknown
- Domain Intelligenceunknown
What happened
Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.Dangerous — confirmed threat
AutomatedIts page title claims to be Google, which this address is not associated with. It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.
What to do
Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.
This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.
Findings
Strongest firstOur Content Inspection engine downloaded the file this URL serves and analyzed it. The payload shows traits commonly seen in malware. Treat it as unsafe until verified.
Success
SHA-256 60d09809d9a49b10832a1b81b3206358ca37f846c386d3c9a3a0b11b70b3ed81
The page never showed this command to the visitor — it silently placed it on their clipboard and instructed them to paste and run something they could not read. The victim executes the attacker's payload themselves; no download or login form is needed.
Our probe obtained it by pressing the fake verification widget on a throwaway copy of the page — the page did not hand it over on load.
Live attacker command — do not run this
This is the exact text the page silently placed on a visitor's clipboard. Pasting it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R), PowerShell, or any terminal will execute the attacker's payload on your machine. Urlyze captured it inside an isolated browser and never executed it.
The page silently placed a shell command on the visitor's clipboard — the ClickFix technique, which relies on the visitor pasting it and pressing Enter themselves. The command is NOT shown anywhere on the page, so the victim runs something they were never allowed to read.
What the victim is shown after clicking Verify (captured on a throwaway copy).
Analyst noteTreat the copied command as the payload — read it for the download URL, the dead-drop (Telegram/blockchain) and the execution method. It never runs in our sandbox; nothing was executed.
The page shows a challenge-provider logo (Cloudflare, reCAPTCHA…) that it fetched from upload.wikimedia.org, and it never contacted that provider's challenge infrastructure — a real Cloudflare or reCAPTCHA gate serves its own assets and talks back to its own servers. Also: the page printed no stock challenge wording our text capture could reach. This is the ClickFix family's costume stage: the fake gate whose checkbox press is what places the command on the clipboard. On the sample this rule was written for, the checkbox press produced no command on that run — this kit withholds it per visit — which is why the costume itself has to count.
Analyst noteOpen the asset URL: a provider logo served from an unrelated (usually compromised) site is the kit's shared infrastructure — pivot on it, every page loading it is the same kit. Re-scan later for the command; the payload rotates per visit.
The page fetched instructions from a public blockchain RPC node while showing the visitor nothing to do with crypto — no wallet, no token, no exchange. The next stage is held in a smart contract instead of on a server, so it survives domain takedowns and can be rewritten by its operator at any time. ⚠️ What this does NOT say: the contract's contents were not read, and the payload it returned — if any — is recorded separately when a later stage delivers it.
Analyst notePivot on these nodes and on the contract address in the request bodies. A page with no crypto surface has no legitimate reason to read a chain.
The page presents itself as a known brand (brand keywords/branding detected).
Analyst noteLow/medium confidence (keyword only) — can be a news article or partner page. Corroborate before acting.
The page dynamically injected scripts from other domains. This is extremely common on legitimate sites (CDNs, analytics, asset domains) and is shown for context only.
Analyst noteNoisy by itself — a CDN/asset domain (e.g. a brand's own *.githubassets.com) is normal. Only meaningful if the source domain is unrelated/suspicious.
Infrastructure
- IP
- 198.251.89.144PONYNET - FranTech Solutions, US · AS53667US
- TLS
- CN=YR2, O=Let's Encrypt, C=US · expires Dec 29, 2026
- Redirects
- 0 hops · / → /
WHOIS
- Registrar
- TuringSign Inc. d/b/a Cosmotown
- Created
- May 31, 2024
- Expires
- May 31, 2027
- Nameservers
- ns15.my-control-panel.comns16.my-control-panel.com
Hashes & fingerprints
Page capture
LiveTitle “Home - iDyeahCentral” · brand shown: Google (low)
Engines
7 · time to verdictPage
- HTTP
- 200 · Completed
- Title
- Home - iDyeahCentral
- Load
- 21.11 s · 219 requests