Scan report · about 1 month agoPublic

www.valeriedalleur.com

188.165.53.185AS16276 · FR

page copied a hidden download-execute command to the visitor's clipboard (ClickFix)

Clipboard command reachesimagehopeag.com

Full command shown, with a warning, under findings

Engine tags
EtherHiding
Verdict

What happened

Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.
Load 16.3 s · 30 requests
01 · Visitor openswww.valeriedalleur.com
02 · Page shown
STORM2U – Valerie Dalleur
03 · Clipboard seeded · hiddenA command the visitor never seesdownload-executeThe text is under findings, behind a warning. It was never run.
04 · OutcomeThe visitor runs the payload themselvesPaste, Enter — no download and no login form for a filter to catch.

Dangerous — confirmed threat

Automated

It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.

What to do

Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.

This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.

Findings

Strongest first
Suspicious fileSuspicious content in the downloaded file
fd84bcac-4225-46f7-b586-164887241a4f.html

Our Content Inspection engine downloaded the file this URL serves and analyzed it. The payload shows traits commonly seen in malware. Treat it as unsafe until verified.

Success

SHA-256 9aef7f6257ecb262ddafe6bd470258551f90290eab21121c5932af9c7d732d76

ClickFixClickFix: a HIDDEN command was copied to the clipboarddownload-execute

The page never showed this command to the visitor — it silently placed it on their clipboard and instructed them to paste and run something they could not read. The victim executes the attacker's payload themselves; no download or login form is needed.

Our probe obtained it by pressing the fake verification widget on a throwaway copy of the page — the page did not hand it over on load.

Live attacker command — do not run this

This is the exact text the page silently placed on a visitor's clipboard. Pasting it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R), PowerShell, or any terminal will execute the attacker's payload on your machine. Urlyze captured it inside an isolated browser and never executed it.

The page silently placed a shell command on the visitor's clipboard and told them to paste it into the Run dialog — the ClickFix technique. The command is NOT shown anywhere on the page, so the victim runs something they were never allowed to read.

What the victim is shown after clicking Verify (captured on a throwaway copy).

Analyst noteTreat the copied command as the payload — read it for the download URL, the dead-drop (Telegram/blockchain) and the execution method. It never runs in our sandbox; nothing was executed.

InfoCross-domain scripts injected at runtime
4 script(s)

The page dynamically injected scripts from other domains. This is extremely common on legitimate sites (CDNs, analytics, asset domains) and is shown for context only.

Analyst noteNoisy by itself — a CDN/asset domain (e.g. a brand's own *.githubassets.com) is normal. Only meaningful if the source domain is unrelated/suspicious.

Infrastructure

IP
188.165.53.185OVH - OVH SAS, FR · AS16276FR
TLS
CN=YE1, O=Let's Encrypt, C=US · expires Nov 2, 2026

WHOIS

Registrar
OVH sas
Created
Dec 17, 2020
Expires
Dec 17, 2026
Nameservers
dns19.ovh.netns19.ovh.net
110 malicious8 suspicious

Hashes & fingerprints

Page capture

Live

Title “STORM2U – Valerie Dalleur”

Engines

7 · time to verdict

Page

HTTP
200 · Completed
Title
STORM2U – Valerie Dalleur
Load
16.29 s · 30 requests
Stack · 8Apache HTTP ServerjQueryjQuery MigratejsDelivrPHPUIKit