Scan report · 21 days agoPublic

palerospropertymanagement.com

160.153.0.121AS209242 · US

page copied a hidden unix-shell-pipe command to the visitor's clipboard (ClickFix)

Engine tags
Verdict

What happened

Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.
Load 5.0 s · 280 requests
01 · Visitor openspalerospropertymanagement.com
02 · Page shown
Home - Paleros Property Managementstyled as Meta · low
03 · File delivered · malicious940267ba-0162-4cc3-a975-3d2f137e9999.html
04 · Clipboard seeded · hiddenA command the visitor never seesunix-shell-pipeThe text is under findings, behind a warning. It was never run.
05 · OutcomeThe visitor runs the payload themselvesPaste, Enter — no download and no login form for a filter to catch.

Dangerous — confirmed threat

Automated

Its page title claims to be Meta, which this address is not associated with. It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. The file it serves was analysed and found malicious. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.

What to do

Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.

This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.

Findings

Strongest first
MalwareMalware found in the downloaded file
940267ba-0162-4cc3-a975-3d2f137e9999.html

Our Content Inspection engine downloaded the file this URL serves and analyzed it as a real payload — it matched known malware. Do not open or run this file.

Success

SHA-256 f479447fd1aa6d0b5426623d862bc334e9f583dddb1afb4d44a9e15ab4c83786

ClickFixClickFix: a HIDDEN command was copied to the clipboardunix-shell-pipe

The page never showed this command to the visitor — it silently placed it on their clipboard and instructed them to paste and run something they could not read. The victim executes the attacker's payload themselves; no download or login form is needed.

Our probe obtained it by pressing the fake verification widget on a throwaway copy of the page — the page did not hand it over on load.

Live attacker command — do not run this

This is the exact text the page silently placed on a visitor's clipboard. Pasting it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R), PowerShell, or any terminal will execute the attacker's payload on your machine. Urlyze captured it inside an isolated browser and never executed it.

The page silently placed a shell command on the visitor's clipboard and told them to paste it into the Run dialog — the ClickFix technique. The command is NOT shown anywhere on the page, so the victim runs something they were never allowed to read.

What the victim is shown after clicking Verify (captured on a throwaway copy).

Analyst noteTreat the copied command as the payload — read it for the download URL, the dead-drop (Telegram/blockchain) and the execution method. It never runs in our sandbox; nothing was executed.

StrongCommand-and-control read from a blockchain node (EtherHiding)
rpc-mainnet.matic.quiknode.pro

The page fetched instructions from a public blockchain RPC node while showing the visitor nothing to do with crypto — no wallet, no token, no exchange. The next stage is held in a smart contract instead of on a server, so it survives domain takedowns and can be rewritten by its operator at any time. ⚠️ What this does NOT say: the contract's contents were not read, and the payload it returned — if any — is recorded separately when a later stage delivers it.

Analyst notePivot on these nodes and on the contract address in the request bodies. A page with no crypto surface has no legitimate reason to read a chain.

SupportingKnown phishing-kit signature matched
FKRC Fake reCAPTCHA ClickFix · FKRC · high

The page's structure/assets match a catalogued phishing kit — pre-built attacker software for cloning a brand's login.

Analyst noteKit rated high, corroborated by an outbound request to the kit's OWN infrastructure on another host — that is the kit running here, not a page that mentions it. 🔴 Do not go looking for a brand match, an exfil endpoint or a form-action mismatch: this is a clipboard-delivery family, it never renders a form, and all six harvesting legs are absent by design — their absence is not evidence against the match. Already observed on this scan: a decoded command · a clipboard write · an address its own code names (http://62.60.156.226/6c5c3cb8a9b?force=1).

InfoBrand impersonation detected
Meta · low

The page presents itself as a known brand (brand keywords/branding detected).

Analyst noteLow/medium confidence (keyword only) — can be a news article or partner page. Corroborate before acting.

InfoCross-domain scripts injected at runtime
11 script(s)

The page dynamically injected scripts from other domains. This is extremely common on legitimate sites (CDNs, analytics, asset domains) and is shown for context only.

Analyst noteNoisy by itself — a CDN/asset domain (e.g. a brand's own *.githubassets.com) is normal. Only meaningful if the source domain is unrelated/suspicious.

Infrastructure

IP
160.153.0.121CLOUDFLARESPECTRUM - Cloudflare London, LLC, US · AS209242US
TLS
CN=WE1, O=Google Trust Services, C=US · expires Nov 13, 2026

WHOIS

Registrar
GoDaddy.com, LLC
Created
Feb 26, 2022
Expires
Feb 26, 2027
Nameservers
ns75.domaincontrol.comns76.domaincontrol.com
132 malicious3 suspicious

Hashes & fingerprints

Page capture

Live

Title “Home - Paleros Property Management” · brand shown: Meta (low)

Engines

7 · time to verdict

Page

HTTP
200 · Completed
Title
Home - Paleros Property Management
Load
4.96 s · 280 requests
Stack · 28BootstrapCanJSCloudflareCloudflare Bot ManagementContact Form 7Elementor