Scan report · 18 days agoPublic

privatehub.icu

172.67.139.171AS13335 · US
Gated · caught after the gate

An interaction gate (e.g. Cloudflare Turnstile) blocked full analysis, but a detection rule identified this page anyway. The pre-gate score below rates only what was visible before the gate — not the evidence this verdict rests on.

this page loaded a hidden, encoded shell command behind an anti-bot gate

decoded from bytes this scan fetched (ClickFix)
Engine tags
Verdict

What happened

Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.
Load 29.6 s · 29 requests
01 · Visitor opensprivatehub.icu
02 · Page shown
Just a moment...
03 · Clipboard seededA command copied to the clipboardThe text is under findings, behind a warning. It was never run.
04 · OutcomeThe visitor runs the payload themselvesPaste, Enter — no download and no login form for a filter to catch.

Dangerous — confirmed threat

Preliminary / could not fully load

It shows a bot-check screen that it draws itself — it copies a protection provider's wording but never contacts that provider. It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.

What to do

Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.

This verdict rests on other evidence: the site never showed us its own page, so its content was not assessed. Re-scan later or verify through a trusted channel.

Findings

Strongest first
ClickFixClickFix: a hidden execution instruction — we read the command out of bytes this page loaded

The lure never opened for us — it sits where our click could not reach it. We decoded the command out of the page's own code instead, in bytes this scan fetched: https://privatehub.icu/api/captcha/command

Live attacker command — do not run this

This is the exact text the page instructs a visitor to run. Pasting it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R), PowerShell, or any terminal will execute the attacker's payload on your machine. Urlyze decoded it out of the page's own code and never executed it.

Command recovered from bytes this page loaded, not from a clipboard: the page's own control plane returned it as plain JSON, to a request the page made by itself, with no interaction required (https://privatehub.icu/api/captcha/command). Evidence for this sample: the response body; no instruction screenshot. Nothing was executed.

The page before any click — our click never reached the lure, so this is not the instruction screen.

Analyst noteTreat the command as the payload — read it for the download URL, the dead-drop (Telegram/blockchain) and the execution method. Evidence for this sample is the command and the response it came from; there is no instruction screenshot, because this kit renders its lure inside an overlay frame. Nothing was executed.

SupportingCopied an EMPTY command behind a verification gate
execCommand

The page performed a copy-to-clipboard step and the copied text was empty. ClickFix kits fetch their command from a control panel rather than carrying it in the page, so an empty copy means no command was in the page at that moment. In THIS scan the command for this visit was recovered anyway, from bytes the page loaded — see the command card: the empty copy is not an absent payload.

Analyst noteAbsence of the command on the clipboard is NOT absence of the technique. Check whether the page also prints Run-dialog instructions, and whether a payload request came back 200 with an empty body — that response is the discriminator between a panel that served nothing and a copy step that ran too early.

InfoBlocked by a bot-protection gate
cloudflare

A bot-protection challenge (e.g. Cloudflare Turnstile) blocked full analysis, so the verdict relies on pre-gate evidence (see the Gated Risk Assessment).

Analyst noteThe gate alone is NOT suspicious — many legitimate sites use it. Read the Gated Risk Assessment for the actual pre-gate risk.

InfoCross-domain scripts injected at runtime
3 script(s)

The page dynamically injected scripts from other domains. This is extremely common on legitimate sites (CDNs, analytics, asset domains) and is shown for context only.

Analyst noteNoisy by itself — a CDN/asset domain (e.g. a brand's own *.githubassets.com) is normal. Only meaningful if the source domain is unrelated/suspicious.

Gated Risk Assessment

This page sits behind a bot-protection gate, but it was already identified by a detection rule — see the verdict reason for what fired. The score below reflects ONLY the weak pre-gate signals (score 0) and does not override that finding.

Pre-gate risk score:0pre-gate signals only

Pre-gate signals

No pre-gate risk signals detected.

Path to gate (1 hops)

finalprivatehub.icu
https://privatehub.icu/

Infrastructure

IP
172.67.139.171CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc., US · AS13335US
TLS
CN=WE1, O=Google Trust Services, C=US · expires Nov 28, 2026

WHOIS

Registrar
PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com
Created
Jul 2, 2026
Expires
Jul 2, 2027
Nameservers
chris.ns.cloudflare.comzariyah.ns.cloudflare.com

Hashes & fingerprints

Page capture

Live

Title “Just a moment...”

Engines

6 · time to verdict

Page

HTTP
200 · AntiBotChallenged
Title
Just a moment...
Load
29.60 s · 29 requests
Stack · 2CloudflareHTTP/3