Scan report · about 2 months agoPublic

easygrillkit.com

38.110.228.189AS174 · US

page hides a command-execution instruction from the visitor

a shell is opened, the clipboard is pasted and run, and none of it is on screen until something is clicked (ClickFix)
Engine tags
Verdict

What happened

Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.
Load 7.5 s · 73 requests
01 · Visitor openseasygrillkit.com
02 · Page shown
Promote Your Business with Merchant Center - Google for Retailstyled as Google · medium
03 · OutcomeThe visitor runs the payload themselvesPaste, Enter — no download and no login form for a filter to catch.

Dangerous — confirmed threat

Automated

Its page title claims to be Google, which this address is not associated with. It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.

What to do

Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.

This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.

Findings

Strongest first
StrongClickFix: the instruction screen was captured — no command could be read
316,820 characters copied — not a recognisable command

Our probe pressed the fake verification widget on a throwaway copy of the page and photographed what it showed: the ClickFix instruction screen. The command itself did not arrive — kits fetch it from their panel at click time, and this one answered with something that is not a command (316,820 characters). The screenshot is the evidence: the page IS instructing a visitor to run something through the Windows Run dialog.

Analyst noteLook at the screenshot — the on-screen steps and any verification ID are the evidence here. A missing command usually means the kit's panel was down, region-gated, or its own template was broken; re-scan later or from another egress to obtain it. Nothing was executed.

SupportingAiTM: brand assets served through a proxy
Google

Images/scripts belonging to a real brand were loaded THROUGH the attacker's host — the hallmark of an adversary-in-the-middle (Evilginx-style) proxy that relays the real login to steal the session.

Analyst noteStrong AiTM indicator when paired with a password form or a form-action mismatch. The brand whose assets are proxied is the impersonation target.

InfoBrand impersonation detected
Google · medium

The page presents itself as a known brand (brand keywords/branding detected).

Analyst noteLow/medium confidence (keyword only) — can be a news article or partner page. Corroborate before acting.

InfoCross-domain scripts injected at runtime
4 script(s)

The page dynamically injected scripts from other domains. This is extremely common on legitimate sites (CDNs, analytics, asset domains) and is shown for context only.

Analyst noteNoisy by itself — a CDN/asset domain (e.g. a brand's own *.githubassets.com) is normal. Only meaningful if the source domain is unrelated/suspicious.

Infrastructure

IP
38.110.228.189COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC, US · AS174US
TLS
CN=YR2, O=Let's Encrypt, C=US · expires Nov 4, 2026

WHOIS

Registrar
HOSTINGER operations, UAB
Created
Aug 6, 2026
Expires
Aug 6, 2027
Nameservers
horizon.dns-parking.comorbit.dns-parking.com
143 malicious5 suspicious

Hashes & fingerprints

Page capture

Live

Title “Promote Your Business with Merchant Center - Google for Retail” · brand shown: Google (medium)

Engines

7 · time to verdict

Page

HTTP
200 · Completed
Title
Promote Your Business with Merchant Center - Google for Retail
Load
7.53 s · 73 requests
Stack · 8BootstrapGoogle AnalyticsGoogle Tag ManagerMaterial Design LiteNginxOpen Graph