Scan report · about 1 month agoPublic

dev.rushtaxresolution.com

188.114.96.0AS13335 · US

page copied a hidden fetch-stdin-execute command to the visitor's clipboard (ClickFix)

Engine tags
EtherHiding
Verdict

What happened

Step by step, from what the scanner recorded.
Load 3.5 s · 30 requests
01 · Visitor opensdev.rushtaxresolution.com
02 · Page shown
WordPress › Error
03 · Clipboard seeded · hiddenA command the visitor never seesfetch-stdin-executeThe text is under findings, behind a warning. It was never run.
04 · OutcomeThe visitor runs the payload themselvesPaste, Enter — no download and no login form for a filter to catch.

Dangerous — confirmed threat

Automated

It is listed on external threat-intelligence feeds. We found strong evidence that this site is malicious — for example a phishing page, a scam, or hostile code. Treat anything it asked for (passwords, card details, codes) as exposed.

What to do

Do not enter any information or download anything. If you already did, change those passwords now and contact your bank if payment details were involved. Block or report the link to your team.

This reflects the evidence found at the time of the scan. If you believe it is a mistake, you can escalate it for analyst review.

Findings

Strongest first
ClickFixClickFix: a HIDDEN command was copied to the clipboardfetch-stdin-execute

The page never showed this command to the visitor — it silently placed it on their clipboard and instructed them to paste and run something they could not read. The victim executes the attacker's payload themselves; no download or login form is needed.

Our probe obtained it by pressing the fake verification widget on a throwaway copy of the page — the page did not hand it over on load.

Live attacker command — do not run this

This is the exact text the page silently placed on a visitor's clipboard. Pasting it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R), PowerShell, or any terminal will execute the attacker's payload on your machine. Urlyze captured it inside an isolated browser and never executed it.

The page silently placed a shell command on the visitor's clipboard and told them to paste it into the Run dialog — the ClickFix technique. The command is NOT shown anywhere on the page, so the victim runs something they were never allowed to read.

What the victim is shown after clicking Verify (captured on a throwaway copy).

Analyst noteTreat the copied command as the payload — read it for the download URL, the dead-drop (Telegram/blockchain) and the execution method. It never runs in our sandbox; nothing was executed.

InfoCross-domain scripts injected at runtime
2 script(s)

The page dynamically injected scripts from other domains. This is extremely common on legitimate sites (CDNs, analytics, asset domains) and is shown for context only.

Analyst noteNoisy by itself — a CDN/asset domain (e.g. a brand's own *.githubassets.com) is normal. Only meaningful if the source domain is unrelated/suspicious.

File

The file was not analysed, so the scan carries no verdict on the file itself.

Infrastructure

IP
188.114.96.0CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc., US · AS13335US
TLS
CN=WE1, O=Google Trust Services, C=US · expires Oct 18, 2026

WHOIS

Registrar
GoDaddy.com, LLC
Created
Jul 31, 2014
Expires
Jul 31, 2027
Nameservers
aaron.ns.cloudflare.comperla.ns.cloudflare.com
87 malicious9 suspicious

Hashes & fingerprints

Page capture

Live

Title “WordPress › Error”

Engines

7 · time to verdict

Page

HTTP
500 · Completed
Title
WordPress › Error
Load
3.52 s · 30 requests
Stack · 4CloudflareHTTP/3PHPYandex.Metrika